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THE NEW FISA COURT AMICUS  
SHOULD BE ABLE TO IGNORE ITS 
CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY 
BEN COOK* 
After the Edward Snowden disclosures regarding the National Security 
Agency’s surveillance activities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), Congress reformed both the substantive FISA surveillance laws and the 
procedural rules of the FISA Court (FISC)—the court Congress established in 
FISA to adjudicate government surveillance requests—to better protect privacy 
interests and increase the representation of privacy interests before the court.  
Previously, the court very rarely heard opposition to the government’s 
arguments supporting surveillance requests.  The reform legislation—the USA 
FREEDOM Act—requires the court to hear from one of five pooled amici when 
it is presented with novel or significant interpretations of law.  The statute also 
requires those pooled amici to support arguments that advance individual 
privacy and civil liberties. 
The statute, however, risks violating separation of powers principles if the 
amicus and FISC interpret the statute narrowly as preventing an amicus from 
advancing arguments that support intelligence collection or conflict with 
individual privacy interests.  While Congress retains total authority to control 
the jurisdiction and procedures of the FISC, the judicial power inherent in any 
court includes the authority to decide the law, administer justice, and control 
the amicus process.  By interfering with the court’s ability to consider which 
arguments it hears from an amicus that the court has appointed to materially 
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assist in deciding the law, the statute would violate the separation of powers 
doctrine.  So, even if such a broad reading would render the amicus duty 
superfluous and insignificant, the court should interpret the amicus duty 
broadly to allow virtually any legal argument that the court deems helpful and 
appropriate.  A broad interpretation would allow the court to fulfill its 
constitutional obligations while avoiding the need to declare the statute in 
violation of the separation of powers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed classified information 
regarding the U.S. government’s surveillance activities.1  These 
disclosures shocked the public because they contained evidence that 
the government’s surveillance included the collection of U.S. 
citizens’ communications.2  The Snowden disclosures prompted a 
national conversation about both the scope of the government’s 
substantive surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)3 and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court’s (FISC) historically non-adversarial proceedings 
to adjudicate government surveillance requests.4 
In June 2015, Congress passed the USA FREEDOM Act 
(FREEDOM Act),5 which reformed some of the substantive 
surveillance authorities and created an amicus curie (“amicus”) pool 
for the FISC judges to use when considering novel or significant legal 
interpretations.  This amicus pool is a watered-down version of prior 
proposals that would have created an independent office to litigate 
before the FISC against the government.6  Even though Congress did 
not choose to house the amicus in a federal office, did not authorize 
funds to pay the amicus, and left control and oversight of the amicus 
pool to the FISC judges, Congress still mandated that the amicus pool 
advocate in a specific way when discussing privacy and civil liberties 
                                            
 1. Barton Gellman et al., Edward Snowden Comes Forward as Source of NSA Leaks, 
WASH. POST (June 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-
leaders-push-back-on-leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e-826d299ff 
459_story.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 103, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 1803 (2012)). 
 4. Evan Perez, Secret Court’s Oversight Gets Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2013, 7:11 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324904004578535670310514616. 
 5. Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring 
Effective Discipline over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 
(codified at scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FREEDOM Act]. 
 6. See infra Section I.C. 
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concerns.7  As a “friend of the court,” the amicus pool should only be 
responsive to the FISC judges, who should be entitled to hear an 
unvarnished view from the amici that they have appointed to help 
them consider novel or significant interpretations of law.  The 
congressionally imposed limitation on potential amicus arguments is 
unconstitutional to the extent that it prevents an amicus from making 
an otherwise helpful argument to the court that has solicited that 
amicus’s assistance.  The FISC should interpret the mandate as 
broadly as possible to avoid having to declare it unconstitutional even 
if this interpretation ignores the legislative history and renders 
statutory phrases superfluous. 
Courts have inherent authority and broad discretion to control the 
nature and extent of an amicus’s participation in a proceeding.8  But 
Congress and the courts are both entrusted with distinct but 
overlapping constitutional powers under the Constitution to operate 
the judicial system, and when Congress legislates regarding the 
courts, the courts retain their powers over their essential 
constitutional functions, minus those powers exercised by Congress.9  
Thus, Congress has “broad power to regulate the structure, 
administration, and jurisdiction of the courts,” but its power is limited 
by the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.10 
                                            
 7. USA FREEDOM Act § 401, 129 Stat. at 279 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C.  
§ 1803(i)(4)(A)) (requiring that the amicus provide arguments that “advance the 
protection of individual privacy and civil liberties”). 
 8. See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–1495, 892 F. Supp. 2d 334, 337 (D.D.C. 
2012) (affirming that it is “solely within the Court’s discretion to determine ‘the fact, 
extent, and manner’ of participation by the amicus”) (quoting United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 2002 WL 319366, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2002)); 
Martinez v. Capital Cities/ABC-WPVI, 909 F. Supp. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating 
that “[a] district court has inherent authority to appoint amicus curiae to assist in a 
proceeding”); In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, slip op. at 8 n.7 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (“Courts 
have broad discretion to determine the nature and extent of the participation of an 
amicus curiae.”); Helen A. Anderson, Frenemies of the Court:  The Many Faces of Amicus 
Curiae, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 361, 397 (2015) (stating that “[r]egardless of what the 
rules say, courts always retain inherent power to appoint amicus curiae”). 
 9. See Joseph J. Anclien, Broader is Better:  The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 40 n.9 (2008) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (explaining the 
separation of powers “zone of twilight” when two branches share concurrent 
authority and the ebb of power when one branch affirmatively acts in an area shared 
with another branch). 
 10. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32926, CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY OVER THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (2005). 
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The FREEDOM ACT highlighted this exact tension between 
Congress and the judicial power.  It required the FISC to appoint five 
individuals to serve in an amici pool, imposed on that amici pool the 
mandate to advocate in support of privacy and civil liberties, and then 
required the FISC to appoint a pooled amicus when an application or 
order “in the opinion of the court, presents a novel or significant 
interpretation of the law, unless the court issues a finding that such 
appointment is not appropriate.”11  When Congress requires a court 
presented with a “novel or significant interpretation of the law” to 
hear from an amicus,12 it risks interfering with the court’s inherent 
judicial powers to decide the law and control the nature of amicus 
participation, especially when it restricts the legal arguments that the 
amicus can provide. 
Congress established the FISC, an Article III court13 with 
jurisdiction over government applications for surveillance authority 
under FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act (PATRIOT Act).14  After 
Edward Snowden disclosed previously classified details of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) and National Security Agency’s (NSA) 
surveillance activities under FISA and the PATRIOT Act in 2013, the 
President, Congress, privacy advocates, and members of the public all 
called for reform.15  Subsequently, in 2015, Congress and the 
President enacted the FREEDOM Act, which included substantive 
reforms to surveillance laws and procedural reforms to the FISC’s 
operations.16  The FREEDOM Act required the FISC to appoint an 
                                            
 11. USA FREEDOM Act § 401, 129 Stat. at 279 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1803(i)) (emphasis added). 
 12. See infra text accompanying note 17. 
 13. See In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (illustrating that 
FISC judges have Article III status, that the FISC proceedings’ ex parte nature is 
consistent with Article III, and that the FISC structure is a “careful effort to provide 
constitutional structure to electronic surveillance”); FISA CT. R. P. 5(a) (providing 
that FISC judges may exercise authority consistent with Article III). 
 14. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 [hereinafter PATRIOT Act].  Both FISA and the PATRIOT Act have been 
amended numerous times since their enactments.  The pertinent sections of each 
statute that regard intelligence activities, surveillance, and the FISA court are 
codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c. 
 15. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 16. FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified at 
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) (ending bulk collection of phone records, requiring 
specific selection terms for records searches, limiting the government’s use of 
information obtained through intelligence collection, and increasing transparency of 
FISA court decisions). 
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amicus when presented with a “novel or significant interpretation of 
the law.”17  The FREEDOM Act further required those appointed 
amici to provide “legal arguments that advance the protection of 
individual privacy and civil liberties.”18 
This statute, creating the amicus pool, walks a fine line between 
Congress’s and the FISC’s respective constitutional powers.  The statute 
does give the court broad discretion to control whether the amicus 
participates, but then the statute interferes with the court-amicus 
relationship by restricting the amicus’s available arguments when 
discussing privacy and civil liberties.  This restriction is especially 
concerning because the court is necessarily appointing the amicus to 
help it interpret novel or significant questions of law.19  Whether this 
restriction is truly an impermissible interference with an inherent court 
power—in violation of the separation of powers doctrine—depends on 
whether the FISC applies a broad or narrow interpretation of that 
amicus duty.  If the restriction prevents the amicus from supporting 
government surveillance efforts and pro-surveillance arguments because 
those arguments are inapposite to its duty to support individual privacy, 
then the restriction could interfere with the court’s ability to hear 
diverse and pertinent arguments from the amicus. 
Congress passed the FREEDOM Act, in part, to address the non-
adversarial nature of FISC proceedings.20  While Congress added 
adversarial mechanisms before 2008,21 the FISC’s empirical record 
revealed almost unanimous approval of government requests.22  After 
the Snowden disclosures, the calls from privacy advocates, 
congressional representatives, and President Obama for FISC reform 
                                            
 17. Id. § 401, 129 Stat. at 279 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(2)(A)). 
 18. Id. (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(4)(A)). 
 19. Id. (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(2)(A)). 
 20. Andrea Peterson, Patriot Act Author:  “There Has Been a Failure of Oversight”, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2013/10/11/patriot-act-author-there-has-been-a-failure-of-oversight. 
 21. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA 
Amendments Act), Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 101, § 702(h)(4), 122 Stat. 2436, 2441–
42 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)) (creating a mechanism for 
companies to challenge foreign surveillance communication record requests); 
Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 105B(h), 121 Stat. 552, 554 
(same), repealed and replaced by FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 
122 Stat. 2436; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-177, § 106(f), 120 Stat. 192, 198 (2006) (same). 
 22. Perez, supra note 4 (reporting that, according to the U.S. Department of 
Justice, the FISA court “rejected only 11 of the more than 33,900 surveillance 
applications by the government” from 1979 to 2012). 
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included proposals to make the FISC more adversarial so that it would 
hear arguments countering the government’s position.23  Therefore, 
the legislative history of the FREEDOM Act demonstrates that 
establishing the FISA amicus pool was an effort to heed those calls for 
reform by providing FISC judges with alternative arguments.24 
This congressional reform effort presents a conflict between two 
judicial doctrines:  the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and the 
statutory construction doctrine that legislative language is non-
superfluous.25  Specifically, if the congressionally-imposed, pro-
privacy amicus duty restricts the amicus from providing an 
appropriate pro-surveillance argument to the court, then Congress 
arguably has interfered with the court’s inherent power to act as the 
                                            
 23. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. S3429 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy) (claiming that before the Snowden disclosures, the FISC only heard the 
government’s arguments); President Barack Obama, Press Conference (Aug. 9, 
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-
press-conference (proposing steps to make the FISC more adversarial); Cyrus Farivar, 
America’s Most Secretive Court Invites Its First Outsider, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 26, 2015, 
3:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/09/americas-most-secretive-
court-invites-its-first-outsider (“[T]here’s no other side [in the FISC]. . . .  [I]t’s not 
adversarial.  The judge hears [the government’s case,] but there’s nobody else to 
argue the other side.” (quoting former Sen. Gary Hart)); Barton Gellman & Laura 
Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad 
Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investig 
ations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html (“This is a 
court that meets in secret, allows only the government to appear before it, and 
publishes almost none of its opinions.  It has never been an effective check on 
government.” (quoting Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Legal Director, American Civil 
Liberties Union)); Dia Kayyali, What You Need to Know About the FISA Court—and How 
It Needs to Change, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deep 
links/2014/08/what-you-need-know-about-fisa-court-and-how-it-needs-change 
(stating that FISC is not adversarial and operates in secret, and arguing that a special 
advocate would make it more adversarial); Raffaela Wakeman, An Overview of FISA 
Reform Options on Capitol Hill, LAWFARE (Nov. 3, 2013, 10:08 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/overview-fisa-reform-options-capitol-hill (explaining 
that telecommunications companies generally do not appeal FISC orders, and that 
no one argues before the court representing the civil liberties concerns because the 
system only has “one party”). 
 24. Infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 25. See generally ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43706, THE DOCTRINE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE:  A LEGAL OVERVIEW (2014) (detailing the rationale 
behind the constitutional avoidance doctrine, which stands for the proposition that a 
court should avoid broad constitutional rulings unless it is unavoidable); LARRY M. 
EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
AND RECENT TRENDS (2011) (explaining the tools used by courts when interpreting 
and applying statutes). 
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gatekeeper for the provision of legal arguments and control the 
amicus process.26  Congress did acknowledge such power by codifying 
the court’s pre-existing discretion to appoint or remove an amicus,27 
but discretion to appoint or remove an amicus does nothing to free 
the appointed amicus from the congressional restriction to support 
pro-privacy arguments.  This relief requires a separate court action:  
either instructing the amicus to disregard any statutory constraint on 
its arguments or interpreting the statutory constraint so broadly as to 
render it superfluous.  And, if the amicus duty to support privacy and 
civil liberties is read so broadly as to allow the amicus to support an 
intrusive government surveillance request,28 then that statutory 
language is superfluous because it would have no real or practical 
meaning.  The constitutional avoidance concern should prevail over 
the non-superfluous words canon, and the statute should be read as 
broadly as possible.  Even though this preference would render 
certain terms of the statute superfluous, it would allow the court to 
avoid the need to order the amicus to disregard the statute’s amicus 
mandate for unconstitutionally violating the separation of powers.  
And it would preserve Department of Justice (DOJ) resources and 
promote judicial efficiency by avoiding needless litigation over the 
statute’s constitutionality.  Otherwise, to read the mandate clause 
strictly, giving every word purpose, would interfere with the court’s 
inherent authority to control the amicus process. 
There is a counterargument that the use of “or” to separate the 
three categories of amicus duties in the statute somehow alleviates 
the amicus of the enumerated requirement to support privacy and 
civil liberties.29  But Congress is speaking about three different 
elemental categories in those subsections, and the use of “or” simply 
functions to prevent an amicus from needing to satisfy all three 
elements.  Regardless, Congress speaks clearly in the subsection that 
                                            
 26. See infra notes 234–37. 
 27. FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 268, 280 (2015) (to be 
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(9)). 
 28. In this hypothetical, the presumably intrusive request would still be legally 
appropriate in the eyes of the amicus, and obviously, the government attorneys who 
first made the request.  But naturally, there are many government surveillance 
requests that logically conflict with the amicus priority to support “individual privacy 
and civil liberties,” especially in context of the stated congressional purpose to better 
protect privacy interests before the FISA court.  See infra notes 113–14 and 
accompanying text. 
 29. See infra text accompanying notes 216–18. 
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regards privacy and civil liberties by directing the amicus to support 
arguments in advance of those priorities. 
When presented with a pro-surveillance amicus argument,30 
notwithstanding the legal precedent on proper statutory 
interpretation methods, the FISC should interpret the amicus duty as 
broadly as required to permit the court to hear any arguments it 
deems appropriate to assist with interpreting novel and significant 
legal issues.  The importance of the court’s need to discharge its 
constitutional duties by deciding the law, and the preference to avoid 
declaring a statute unconstitutional, outweigh the statutory 
interpretation canon that language is not superfluous.  Mechanically, 
the court already has broad discretion to control when and whether 
to hear from the amicus.  In exercising that control, the court should 
simply allow the amicus to provide any legal arguments it deems 
appropriate and helpful even if those arguments conflict with or 
violate the congressionally imposed amicus duty to support individual 
privacy and civil liberties. 
Part I of this Comment provides background on the FISC’s 
jurisdiction, structure, activities, and reform; the Snowden disclosures 
and subsequent calls for an adversarial FISC presence; and the 
FREEDOM Act’s text and legislative history.  Part II then outlines the 
Supreme Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence regarding the 
boundary between legislative actions that impact court proceedings 
and inherent judicial powers.  Part II also explains the traditional role 
of an amicus in court proceedings, highlights the characteristics of 
federal officers and other statutorily created entities that could 
compare to the FISA amicus pool, and provides background on the 
statutory interpretation jurisprudence regarding superfluous words, 
the separation of statutory elements with “or,” and the canon of 
constitutional avoidance.  Part III of this Comment then compares 
the enacted FISA amicus pool provision, which retained statutory 
language from prior proposals to create standing federal entities, to 
the statutory framework of other federal officer positions that must 
comply with the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution.31  
This analysis supplements the argument, based on the separation of 
powers doctrine, that the amicus should be responsive only to the 
judicial branch and should not be beholden to congressionally 
imposed duties like other federal officers.  Part IV concludes that to 
avoid this constitutional conflict, the FISC should interpret the scope 
                                            
 30. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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of the amicus’s role to be as broad as necessary to allow the court to 
hear any arguments it deems appropriate even if the interpretation 
renders the statutory language superfluous. 
I. FISA COURT JURISDICTION, STRUCTURE, BACKGROUND, AND 
REFORM 
A. FISC Jurisdiction and Structure 
FISA created the FISC to hear domestic applications and grant order 
requests for electronic surveillance under FISA.32  The court is 
composed of eleven sitting U.S. district court judges appointed by the 
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.33  The judges operate under 
the authority of the FISA statute, and like the judges of the federal 
district and circuit courts established by Congress, they are 
empowered under Article III of the Constitution.34  FISA also 
established a FISA Court of Review (FISC-R), composed of three 
judges designated by the Chief Justice.35  The FISC can certify a case 
for FISC-R review when such certification would provide uniformity 
or would serve the interests of justice.36 
The purpose of the court is to hear applications, certifications, 
petitions, and motions37 from the government under various sections 
of FISA and the PATRIOT Act; these range from requests for 
electronic surveillance,38 physical searches,39 pen register and trap 
and trace surveillance,40 PATRIOT ACT section 215 requests for 
production of tangible business records,41 and FISA section 702 
                                            
 32. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511,  
§ 103(a), 92 Stat. 1783, 1788 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)). 
 33. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1).  FISA originally required only seven judges.  FISA 
§ 103(a)(1), 92 Stat. at 1788. 
 34. In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
 35. FISA § 103(b), 92 Stat. at 1788 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b)). 
 36. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(j) (West 2015). 
 37. FISA CT. R. P. 6. 
 38. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a). 
 39. § 1822(c). 
 40. § 1843(a)(1). 
 41. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C.  
§ 1861(b)(1)).  The FISC has interpreted “tangible” business records to be a very 
broad term that includes phone records. 
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certifications regarding the targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably 
believed to be outside the United States.42 
FISC proceedings differ in form.  Some resemble proceedings 
before a magistrate where the government is seeking a warrant,43 
whereas the most scrutinized requests, those under section 215 and 
section 702, by definition can be adversarial.44  The persons or 
companies receiving surveillance orders can challenge them by filing 
petitions with the FISC.45  Some proceedings are by necessity ex parte 
due to the inclusion of classified information.46  But where a person 
or company is being required to comply with an order under sections 
215 or 702, that person or company may challenge the order. 
Congress has modified FISC’s jurisdiction in several ways.  First, 
after the events of September 11, 2001, Congress expanded the 
FISC’s jurisdiction to include the adjudication of enhanced 
surveillance activities, including requests for the production of 
“tangible things” (“section 215” orders), under the PATRIOT Act,47 
and certifications of warrantless surveillance of non-U.S. persons 
reasonably believed to be abroad (“section 702” certifications), 
authorized by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.48  Congress also 
expanded FISC jurisdiction with structural reforms creating the 
potential for an adversarial element.  Congress first created a 
statutory mechanism for an adversary in 2006 when it authorized 
persons receiving production orders under section 215 to challenge 
the order by filing a petition with the FISC.49  Finally, Congress 
authorized communication service providers to challenge foreign 
                                            
 42. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702(i)(1), 122 Stat. 
2436, 2439 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)) (providing review by the FISC of 
government certifications under § 1881a(g)).  These Section 702 requests are 
warrantless because they target non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be overseas. 
 43. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(1). 
 44. See § 1803(a)(2)(A) (authorizing procedures for other parties to petition to 
challenge orders under § 1861(f)(2)(A) and § 1881a(h)(4)); FISA CT. R. P. 7–8 
(outlining submissions in adversarial proceedings). 
 45. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2)(A). 
 46. FISA CT. R. P. 7(j) (requiring the government to file and serve an unclassified 
or redacted version of an ex parte submission on the other party). 
 47. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(1)). 
 48. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 101, § 702(g), 122 
Stat. 2436, 2439 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881(i)(1)(A)). 
 49. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-177, § 106(f)(2), 120 Stat. 192, 197 (2006) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.  
§ 1861(f)(2)). 
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intelligence directives50 in 200751 and again in 2008 when it codified 
FISA section 702.52  Besides individuals whose communications have 
in fact been collected during surveillance activities,53 only the 
government and telecommunications companies have established 
standing to litigate FISA requests.54 
Congress has also maintained oversight of FBI and NSA operations 
under section 215 and 702.  It has required intelligence community 
annual reports for section 215 activities since 200155 and for section 
702 activities since 2008.56  While some members of Congress may not 
be privy to the operations of the FISC because they do not sit on the 
House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, all 
members possess the requisite access to intelligence for ongoing U.S. 
intelligence operations.57 
                                            
 50. Foreign intelligence directives are FISC orders to service providers to provide 
electronic communications records. 
 51. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552, 554, repealed 
and replaced by FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436. 
 52. FISA Amendments Act sec. 101, § 702(h), 122 Stat. at 2438 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. 1881(h)(4)). 
 53. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, No. 14-42-cv, slip op. at 27 (2nd Cir. May 7, 2015) 
(rejecting the argument that a plaintiff’s standing depended on the government 
reviewing, not just collecting, their communication records); Klayman v. Obama, No. 
13-851, slip op. at 20 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2015) (differentiating between theoretical harm 
and the harm associated with the actual collection of a communication record). 
 54. Compare Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (holding that 
Amnesty International did not have standing to litigate under FISA based on the 
possibility of communication interceptions in the future), with In re Directives to 
Yahoo! Inc. Pursuant to Section 105B of the FISA, No. 08-01, 2008 WL 10632524, at 
*3 (FISA Ct. Rev. Aug. 22, 2008) (holding that Yahoo had standing to litigate under 
FISA because of its burden in responding to the government’s requests), and In re 
Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 
14-01, 2014 WL 5463097, *1, *3 (FISA Ct. Mar. 20, 2014) (finding that a 
telecommunications company would have standing due to the burden of providing 
call records to the government). 
 55. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 215, § 502, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1862). 
 56. FISA Amendments Act of 2008 sec. 101, § 707, 122 Stat. at 2457 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. 1881a(l)(1)). 
 57. Members of Congress “have access to intelligence by virtue of their elected 
positions.  They do not receive security clearances per se.”  III.  How Intelligence—
Sharing Works at Present, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sharing-
secrets-with-lawmakers-congress-as-a-user-of-intelligence/3.htm (last updated July 7, 
2008) (adding that “individual Members who do not serve on national security 
committees may request intelligence support,” and that for votes on intelligence 
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B. FISC Operations Before the 2013 Snowden Disclosures Were Potentially 
Adversarial in Theory but Often Non-Adversarial in Practice 
Even though Congress had access to information regarding the 
activities of the U.S. intelligence community, the 2013 Edward 
Snowden disclosures about the FBI’s and NSA’s intelligence 
collection activities, and the FISC’s approval of those activities under 
FISA and the PATRIOT Act, caused understandable public shock.58  
This shock soon focused on how and why the FISC had approved 
such surveillance in the first place, which highlighted the fact that 
many people were unfamiliar with the FISC itself, let alone its 
structure and procedures.  Snowden’s main disclosures were about 
the pervasive nature of the surveillance activities and intelligence 
collection related to the PRISM program and the section 215 phone 
records program.  The PRISM program, authorized by section 702 of 
FISA, allowed the NSA to collect emails, videos, voice calls, social 
network data, and login information from telecommunications 
firms.59  Further, under PATRIOT Act section 215, the government 
collected millions of domestic phone records, including numbers 
and call lengths but not call content.60 
After the Snowden disclosures, public scrutiny focused on the 
FISC, which had approved virtually all of the government’s 
surveillance requests.  While the FISC technically had the authority 
since 200661 and 200762 to oversee adversarial-type proceedings when 
considering section 215 and section 702 surveillance requests, 
respectively, records indicate that the FISC approved nearly every 
government surveillance request.63  For example, from “1979 through 
2012, the [FISC] . . . rejected only 11 of the more than 33,900 
surveillance applications by the government.”64  Notably, the FISC 
                                            
issues, “the Intelligence Community will be asked to provide briefings that are open 
to the entire body”). 
 58. Gellman et al., supra note 1. 
 59. See Leo Kelion, Q&A:  NSA’s Prism Internet Surveillance Scheme, BBC (June 25, 
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-23027764. 
 60. See Ariane de Vogue, Court Rules NSA Program Illegal, CNN (May 7, 2015, 3:45 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/07/politics/nsa-telephone-metadata-illegal-court. 
 61. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-177, § 106(f), 120 Stat. 192, 198 (2006) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.  
§ 1861(f)(2) (2012)). 
 62. Protect America Act of 2007, sec. 2, § 105B, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552, 
554, repealed and replaced by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 
122 Stat. 2436 (2008). 
 63. Perez, supra note 4. 
 64. Id. 
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can also modify an order instead of rejecting it, but statistics show 
that it does so sparingly.  In 2012, the FISC modified 40 of the 1856 
FISA applications it received, and rejected none.65  FISC critics cite 
these statistics as evidence that the court was simply a rubber stamp 
for government requests, while supporters point out that the court 
was always more likely to grant the requests because the DOJ only 
submitted requests that it knew the court would grant.66 
Interestingly, one company went to great lengths to oppose a 
government surveillance request by litigating before the FISC.  
Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo”) litigated an extended case from 2007 to 2008 
with the government before the FISC and FISC-R regarding FISC 
intelligence directives under the Protect America Act,67 which was a 
one-year authorization of foreign intelligence acquisition.68  The FISC 
ordered arguments from both parties after Yahoo refused to comply 
with a court directive; Yahoo then appealed the FISC decision to the 
FISC-R and successfully argued appellate jurisdiction under the 
extant statutory mechanism for service providers to oppose 
compulsion orders.69  Clearly, the Yahoo litigation proves wrong any 
                                            
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.; see also Herb Lin, On the FISA Court and “Rubber Stamping”, LAWFARE BLOG 
(Apr. 13, 2015, 2:07 PM) https://www.lawfareblog.com/fisa-court-and-rubber-
stamping (noting that observers respond to the rubber stamp accusation by arguing 
that the government “take[s] special care” when applying to the FISC). 
 67. See Brief of Appellant at 8, Yahoo! v. United States, No. 08-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. 
May 29, 2008) [hereinafter Yahoo Brief], https://cdt.org/files/2014/09/1-
yahoo702-brief.pdf.  In September 2014, Yahoo and the government reached an 
agreement allowing the company to release forty-nine FISA court litigation 
documents, including many briefs from both parties and some court opinions.  Yahoo 
v. U.S. PRISM Documents, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 12, 2014), 
https://cdt.org/insight/yahoo-v-u-s-prism-documents; see also Ron Bell, Shedding 
Light on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC):  Court Findings from Our 2007–
2008 Case, YAHOO! (Sept. 11, 2014), https://yahoopolicy.tumblr.com/post/97238899 
258/shedding-light-on-the-foreign-intelligence (announcing the release of court 
documents). 
 68. Protect America Act of 2007, sec. 2, § 105B, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552, 
552, repealed and replaced by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 
122 Stat. 2436. 
 69. In re Directives to [redacted text]* Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (holding 
that Yahoo had standing to challenge a compulsion order and appeal the FISC 
decision to the FISC-R, agreeing with Yahoo that its response was the functional 
equivalent to a petition under the statute, and explaining that Congress “expressly 
declare[d]” that a service provider had a “right of action” and could seek relief 
through a statutory mechanism); Letter from Reggie B. Walton, FISC Presiding 
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statements that claimed the FISC did not have a functioning 
adversarial mechanism prior to the FREEDOM Act. 
While Yahoo’s case was the only pre-Snowden service provider 
challenge, the FISC-R and the FISC’s judges have reinforced that the 
FISC already contained an adversarial framework.70  In response to 
the question of whether the FISC had previously invited or heard the 
views of non-government parties, Judge Reggie B. Walton, the former 
Presiding FISC Judge, explained that, as of July 29, 2013, only Yahoo 
had substantively challenged a government directive.71  While this was 
true in 2013, at least one other company exercised its right to 
challenge government orders in 2014, which was after the Snowden 
disclosures and before passage of the USA FREEDOM Act.72  
Regarding an amicus, Judge Walton did state that FISA “does not 
provide a mechanism for the Court to invite the views of 
nongovernmental parties” and reiterated that several sections of the 
statute require ex parte proceedings, but he also acknowledged that 
the FISC-R invited amicus briefs in 2002, and he did not specifically 
mention any reason why the FISC or FISC-R would have been 
prevented from appointing other amici.73  Both an adversarial 
framework providing for substantive litigation and the potential for 
amicus appointments existed long before the FREEDOM Act. 
Notwithstanding Yahoo’s extensive litigation against the 
government and the clear existence of an adversarial framework for 
other companies, the DOJ’s high success rate in its surveillance 
requests fed the narrative that the FISC was only hearing one side’s 
argument.74  While the FISC-R heard alternative arguments from 
amicus curiae as far back as 2002,75 the only other appearances by 
                                            
Judge, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (July 29, 2013), 
at 7–9 [hereinafter Walton Letter]. 
 70. In re Directives to [redacted text], 551 F.3d at 1008–09; In re Application of the 
FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01, 2014 WL 
5463097, at *3 (FISA Ct. Mar. 20, 2014) (holding that a company had the “right to bring 
a challenge in this Court to enforce the rights of its customers” under 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1861(f)(2)(A)(i)); Walton Letter, supra note 69, at 7–9 (explaining that FISA and the 
FISC’s procedural rules “provide multiple opportunities for the recipients of Court orders 
or government directives to challenge those orders or directives”). 
 71. Walton Letter, supra note 69, at 7–8. 
 72. In re Application of the FBI, 2014 WL 5463097, at *3. 
 73. Walton Letter, supra note 69, at 7–8. 
 74. See Perez, supra note 4 (reporting that critics argued the government was 
subject to little oversight in the FISC process). 
 75. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717, 717 (FISA Ct. 
Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (accepting amicus briefs from the American Civil Liberties 
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non-governmental parties before the FISC or FISC-R—other than 
Yahoo—before the Snowden disclosures were related to court 
disclosure issues and were not direct challenges to intelligence 
directives or orders.76  The debate over FISC structure suffered from 
a lack of context:  privacy advocates wanted more adversarial 
challenges to the government, and they promoted vast structural 
changes under the argument that the FISC was not, at all, adversarial.  
The Yahoo litigation demonstrates that these claims were on their 
face untrue.  Admittedly, on the other side, privacy advocates are 
correct that service providers have used the adversarial mechanism 
very rarely.  But there is a difference between a mechanism existing at 
all and a mechanism’s frequency of use.  As the next section explains, 
the proposals for reform never focused on improving the existing 
mechanism that had already provided for a substantive and 
adversarial litigation on important privacy issues.  Instead, they 
proposed fundamental and novel structural reforms to the FISC, 
which were fed by the misleading narrative that the FISC had no 
existing adversarial mechanism and was somehow incapable of 
appointing amici on its own accord. 
C. After the Snowden Disclosures:  Calls for FISC Reform to Make the 
Proceedings More Adversarial 
After the Snowden disclosures, the narrative about FISC 
proceedings acting as a “rubber-stamp” stuck with privacy advocates 
and congressional policy makers.  One aspect that they found 
particularly concerning was the non-adversarial nature of the court’s 
proceedings.77  Soon thereafter, varied proposals to create a standing 
federal entity or independent group that would advocate against the 
government and defend public privacy rights came from many 
commentators, including President Obama,78 major newspaper 
                                            
Union and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in an appeal from 
the FISC). 
 76. Walton Letter, supra note 69, at 7–10. 
 77. See, e.g., ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43362, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS:  PROCEDURAL AND 
OPERATIONAL CHANGES 4 (2014) (finding that the FISC “operate[s] largely in secret and 
in a non-adversarial fashion”); Kayyali, supra note 23 (stating that the FISC depended “on 
one-sided information from the government”); sources cited supra note 23. 
 78. President Barack Obama, Press Conference, supra note 23 (proposing steps 
to make the FISC more adversarial); see also RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD:  REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 204 (2013), 
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editorials,79 former FISA judges,80 and privacy advocates.81  Members 
of Congress included these concerns in many different proposals to 
create an adversarial public advocate before the FISC. 
The congressional proposals for this adversarial public advocate 
differed in style and structure.  The original version of the 
FREEDOM Act, introduced in the prior Congress and proposed by 
Representative James Sensenbrenner, would have created an “Office of 
the Special Advocate” with litigation powers within the judicial branch 
that would “vigorously advocate . . . in support of legal interpretations 
that protect individual privacy and civil liberties.”82  Another proposal 
from a FISA reform advocate, Senator Richard Blumenthal, would 
have created an “Office of the Special Advocate” with litigation powers 
in the executive branch that would “have standing as a party” and 
vigorously advocate for “legal interpretations that minimize the scope 
                                            
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf 
(recommending a “Public Interest Advocate,” which could be invited to participate 
in matters by a FISC judge or intervene on their own authority). 
 79. See, e.g., Editorial, Ideas for Reforming the FISA Court, WASH. POST (July 23, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ideas-for-reforming-the-fisa-court 
/2013/07/23/9a3f35e4-f31b-11e2-bdae-0d1f78989e8a_story.html (identifying several 
ways to make the FISC more adversarial); Editorial, Privacy and the FISA Court, L.A. 
TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/10/opinion/la-ed-fisa-
court-20130710 (advocating for a mechanism by which a government lawyer should 
be appointed to oppose cases that raise a novel legal question). 
 80. James G. Carr, Opinion, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html 
(explaining former FISC judge James G. Carr’s suggestion that Congress authorize 
FISC judges to appoint independent lawyers to challenge government applications); 
Dan Roberts, US Must Fix Secret FISA Courts, Says Top Judge Who Granted Surveillance 
Orders, GUARDIAN (July 9, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/ 
jul/09/fisa-courts-judge-nsa-surveillance (describing the support for an adversary 
from former FISC judge James Robertson). 
 81. Orin Kerr, A Proposal to Reform FISA Court Decision Making, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (July 8, 2013, 1:12 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/08/a-
proposal-to-reform-fisa-court-decisionmaking (proposing to add an adversarial role 
in the FISC to the responsibility of the Oversight Section of the National Security 
Division of the Department of Justice); Steve Vladeck, Making FISC More Adversarial:  
A Brief Response to Orin Kerr, LAWFARE (July 8, 2013, 11:46 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/making-fisc-more-adversarial-brief-response-orin-kerr 
(suggesting that private lawyers with security clearances should serve as adversaries in 
FISC cases); Benjamin Wittes, My Statement Today Before the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
LAWFARE (Sept. 26, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/my-statement-
today-senate-intelligence-committee (arguing that the FISC should have the 
flexibility to choose an adversarial process in a given case). 
 82. H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 401 (2013). 
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of surveillance and the extent of data collection.”83  Yet another 
proposal, by Representative Stephen Lynch, envisioned an 
independent executive branch office for a “Privacy Advocate General,” 
who would have been required to “serve as opposing counsel with respect 
to any application by the Federal Government,” and to “oppose any 
Federal Government request for an order.”84  Many members of 
Congress introduced similar proposals in 2013.85 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) analyzed the many 
proposals and found that the suggestions for a permanent, federal, 
adversarial advocate presented numerous potential constitutional 
issues:  (1) the advocate could lack standing to litigate under the case 
or controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution; (2) the 
advocate would likely be considered a government officer and would 
need to comply with the Appointments Clause; and (3) housing the 
advocate in the judicial branch might violate the separation of powers 
by providing the judicial branch with a political power or by 
undermining the neutrality of the judiciary.86  CRS instead suggested 
that placing adversarial interests in a limited amicus position with no 
practical litigation powers would be the safest constitutional proposal 
because the amicus would not need standing, would not be a federal 
officer, and would not litigate.87  Such a scheme would also comport 
with the traditional role of an amicus simply to provide the court with 
helpful legal arguments and not to accede to the level of a party with 
litigation powers.88  After the CRS report, the public advocate 
proposals lost steam.  When the initial 113th Congress’s version of 
the FREEDOM Act eventually passed the House in May 2014, the 
independent advocate position had been removed.89  While the 
                                            
 83. S. 1467, 113th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2013). 
 84. H.R. 2849, 113th Cong. (2013) (emphasis added). 
 85. See S. 1551 § 402(d), 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing an “Office of the 
Constitutional Advocate” in the judicial branch); H.R. 3159 § 2(b), 113th Cong. 
(2013) (allowing for the appointment of “public interest advocates”); H.R. 3228 § 3, 
113th Cong. (2013) (establishing an “Office of the Constitutional Advocate” in the 
judicial branch). 
 86. ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43260, REFORM OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS:  INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE 10, 
17–19, 21, 44–45 (2014). 
 87. Id. at 25–26. 
 88. See infra text accompanying notes 158–78 (outlining the traditional role of 
amici in federal courts). 
 89. H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, May 22, 
2014). 
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Senate did not vote on that version of the FREEDOM Act,90 when 
Representative Sensenbrenner reintroduced the FREEDOM Act in 
the 114th Congress, the bill then contained no creation of an “office” 
but instead included the amicus provision and duty that would 
eventually be signed into law.91  While Congress appears to have 
heeded CRS’s concerns about the standing of the special advocate 
office, it still tried to preserve in the amicus pool the adversarial 
language contained in the prior special advocate proposals. 
D. USA FREEDOM Act Creates Amicus Pool 
The FREEDOM Act created an amicus pool of five amici, at least 
one of which the FISC must appoint when presented with novel or 
significant legal questions.  The FREEDOM ACT passed the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 338-88 on May 13, 2015, and passed the 
Senate by a vote of 67-32 on June 2, 2015.92  The Constitutional 
Authority Statement93 for the FREEDOM Act stated that the power to 
enact the legislation was under the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clauses of Article I of the Constitution.94  
President Obama subsequently signed the FREEDOM Act into law on 
June 2, 2015.95  The FREEDOM Act codified the pooled amici 
provision and required the presiding FISC and FISC-R judges to 
designate, within 180 days, at least five individuals “to be eligible to 
serve as amicus curiae, who shall serve pursuant to rules the presiding 
judges may establish.”96  The provision requires the court to appoint 
one of the pooled amici when an application or order “in the opinion 
                                            
 90. Actions Overview:  H.R. 3361, CONGRESS.GOV https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 
113th-congress/house-bill/3361/actions (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 91. H.R. 2048, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted). 
 92. Actions Overview:  H.R. 2048, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 
114th-congress/house-bill/2048/actions (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 93. Clause 7 of House Rules XII requires that such a statement accompany each 
bill or joint resolution introduced in the House, citing the power(s) granted to 
Congress in the Constitution to enact the proposed law.  RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, R. XII, cl. 7(C)(1), 114th Cong. (2015), http://clerk.house.gov/ 
legislative/house-rules.pdf. 
 94. Constitutional Authority Statement of H.R. 2048, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2048 (follow “Constitutional 
Authority Statement” link) (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 95. Action Overview:  H.R. 2048, supra note 92. 
 96. FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 268, 279 (2015) (to be 
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)). 
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of the court, presents a novel or significant interpretation of the law, unless 
the court issues a finding that such appointment is not appropriate.”97 
To qualify under the statute for the amicus pool, the amici must 
(1) be experts in “privacy and civil liberties, intelligence collection, 
communications technology, or any other area that may lend legal or 
technical expertise” to the court98 and (2) have a security clearance 
that allows them access to relevant classified information.99  The 
statute also requires that the appointed amici have access to FISC 
precedent and prior orders.100  Finally, the amici provision establishes 
the following duties: 
If [the FISC or FISC-R] appoints an amicus curiae under paragraph 
(2)(A), the amicus curiae shall provide to the court, as 
appropriate— 
(A) legal arguments that advance the protection of individual privacy and 
civil liberties; 
(B) information related to intelligence collection or 
communications technology; or 
(C) legal arguments or information regarding any other area 
relevant to the issue presented to the court.101 
Thus, the statute allows amicus duties covering three topics:  (1) 
privacy and civil liberty concerns, (2) intelligence collection and 
technology, and (3) a catch-all for other subject matter areas that 
leaves deference to the court.  When arguing privacy and civil liberty 
concerns, the statute requires the amicus to support those issues. 
Further, the legislative history of the FREEDOM Act reveals that 
the above-cited amicus duty to advance pro-privacy arguments was 
one of Congress’s key motivations in creating the amicus pool.  
Representative Sensenbrenner described how congressional 
proposals in the 2013 version of the FREEDOM Act would have 
created “an office of [the] public advocate to represent the public 
and privacy interests . . . allow[ing] a judge to be a judge rather than 
hearing one side of the argument.”102  Even though the provision creating 
the “Office of the Special Advocate” was removed, Congress’s intent 
to add an adversarial entity to the FISC remained in the form of the 
                                            
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added); see infra text accompanying notes 252–54 (explaining 
the two interpretations for the use of “or” to separate the statutory amicus duties). 
 102. Peterson, supra note 20 (emphasis added). 
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amicus provision.103  Moreover, the statutory language that would 
have imposed a duty on the Special Advocate to provide legal 
arguments advancing privacy and civil liberties is the same language 
as that included in the enacted bill, imposing the same duty on the 
amicus curiae.104  The drafters’ attempt to preserve the adversarial 
role of an advocate is evinced by their use of the same language as the 
prior proposal.  This language directs the amicus to support privacy 
protection—the side of the argument that they lamented was 
previously unrepresented and is logically opposite to the 
government’s surveillance requests. 
Throughout the legislative process, the merit, scope, and 
interpretation of the amicus duty have been controversial.  James C. 
Duff, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts,105 submitted a letter that a congressman entered into the 
congressional record.  That letter expressed concern that the “rank-
and-file government personnel” could “[perceive] . . . that the FISA 
process involves a ‘panel of experts’ officially charged with opposing the 
government’s efforts,” which “could risk deterring the necessary and 
critical cooperation and candor.”106  It further expressed concern that 
“imposing the mandatory ‘duties’ . . . could create such a perception 
within the government that a standing body exists to oppose intelligence 
activities.”107  The letter concluded that “the ‘panel of experts’ . . . 
may prove counterproductive,” and that true amici without such a 
mandate would be free from “any implication that such experts are 
expected to oppose the intelligence activities proposed by the 
government.”108 
                                            
 103. See supra text accompanying note 101. 
 104. Compare H.R. 3361 § 902(c)(3), 113th Cong. (2013) (providing the Special 
Advocate the duty to advocate “in support of legal interpretations that protect 
individual privacy and civil liberties”), with FREEDOM Act § 401, 129 Stat. at 279 
(requiring amicus curiae to advocate, if appropriate, in support of “legal arguments 
that advance the protection of individual privacy and civil liberties”). 
 105. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts is a judicial branch 
office; the Director is appointed and subject to removal by the Chief Justice.  28 
U.S.C. § 601 (2012).  The Director supervises the administrative matters related to 
federal dockets.  § 604.  All officers and employees of the office are prohibited from 
practicing law in any court.  § 607.  The employees of the agency are federal officers.  
Pollack v. Hogan, 703 F.3d 117, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
 106. 161 CONG. REC. S3420 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (letter from Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts dated May 4, 2015) (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. (emphasis added). 
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
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In considering the FREEDOM Act, several senators agreed with 
Director Duff’s interpretation that the amicus pool existed to oppose 
the government.  For instance, Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell introduced Amendment No. 1451, a failed amendment to 
the version of the FREEDOM Act that Congress ultimately enacted, 
which would have removed the amicus provision.109  During 
consideration of this amendment, Senator John Cornyn also 
questioned the language of the bill and called the mandate a “strange 
provision . . . [that] essentially . . . put[s] a defense attorney in the 
grand jury room and create[s] an adversarial process at the early 
stages of an investigation.”110  Similarly, Senator Orrin Hatch then 
added that the approach “threatens to insert leftwing activists into an 
incredibly sensitive . . . process, a radical move that would stack the 
deck against our law enforcement and intelligence communities.”111  
Finally, Senator Richard Burr expressed his understanding that 
“‘shall’ is an indication of ‘you must,’” which would require specific 
action rather than simply permit it.112 
In support of the amicus duty, Senator Richard Blumenthal 
explained that “to have only one side represented skews . . . the 
operations of that court because we know that judges make better 
decisions when they hear both sides and rights are better 
protected.”113  He stated that the amici would protect “our rights and 
liberties because [they] would be public advocates protecting public 
constitutional rights” and would “[present] the side opposing the 
                                            
 109. 161 CONG. REC. S3374 (daily ed. June 1, 2015) (Senate Amendment No. 
1451); 161 CONG. REC. S3340 (daily ed. May 31, 2015) (Senate Amendment No. 
1451); Benjamin Wittes, Legislative Staff Memo on USA Freedom Act Amendments, 
LAWFARE (June 1, 2015, 11:38 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legislative-staff-
memo-usa-freedom-act-amendments (republishing an internal Senate Republican 
staff memorandum, which expressed separation of powers concerns over the amicus 
appointment mechanism, and describing the amicus’s role as “not a dispassionate 
aide to the court’s work, but rather a third party given a specific substantive 
argument to make before the court”). 
 110. 161 CONG. REC. S3428 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (statement of Sen. Cornyn). 
 111. 161 CONG. REC. S3440 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 112. 161 CONG. REC. S3385, S3389 (daily ed. June 1, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Burr).  Senator Burr was referring to the language requiring the court to hear from 
an amicus rather than the language requiring the amicus to support individual 
privacy; however, his interpretation of “shall” as a restrictive word is instructive for 
statutory interpretation and congressional intent.  See infra Sections II.B & IV. 
 113. 161 CONG. REC. S3431 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Blumenthal) (emphasis added). 
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government[, which] is important to the [FISC]; that is, everybody 
makes better decisions when they hear both sides of the argument.”114 
But, eventually, Senator Blumenthal and Senator Patrick Leahy, in 
supporting the amicus provision, admitted the vulnerabilities in the 
amicus’s abilities to oppose the government.  Senator Leahy, for 
example, acknowledged that the appointment of an amicus would be 
entirely left to the court, an acknowledgement that the amicus should 
be a court-controlled entity.115  Senator Blumenthal similarly softened 
his prior statements and explained that the amicus provision 
does not direct an amicus to oppose intelligence activity or to oppose the 
government’s view or position.  In fact, it is to enlighten the court.  
In some instances it may oppose the government, but it is as part of 
that process of constructively arriving at the correct legal 
interpretation—not as a kind of knee-jerk reaction to oppose the 
government.116 
These statements show that even the supporters of the provision did 
not vigorously defend the pro-privacy language when challenged. 
E. The FISA Amicus Pool After Enactment 
The amicus pool consists of non-government amici.117  These 
“private amici” do not sit in a federal office, and the pool has no 
director.118  All five amici are appointed by the presiding judge of the 
FISC.119  They do not have litigation powers, and they appear only at 
the discretion of the judge in the proceedings.120  The FISC has 
declared amici, for purposes of handling classified information, as 
“court personnel.”121  Still, the amicus has been referred to as a 
                                            
 114. 161 CONG. REC. S3396–97 (daily ed. June 1, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Blumenthal) (emphasis added) (asserting that the amicus would “help safeguard 
essential liberties not just for the individuals who might be subjects of 
surveillance . . . but for all of us”). 
 115. 161 CONG. REC. S3430 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 116. 161 CONG. REC. S3431 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Blumenthal) (emphasis added). 
 117. See infra text accompanying notes 172–78 (describing “public amici,” which 
are government amici). 
 118. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(i) (West 2015). 
 119. § 1803(i)(1). 
 120. See § 1803(i) (containing no powers for the amicus to request relief from the 
court and only the opportunity to provide briefs to help interpret law); § 1803(i)(9) 
(the court has power to designate, appoint, remove, and train the amici). 
 121. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things, No. BR 15-99, slip op. at 4 (FISA Ct. Sept. 17, 2015). 
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“‘public interest’ privacy advocate.”122  While many privacy 
commentators supported the adversarial nature of the amicus 
provision,123 others noted the already nominal and weak nature of amici, 
highlighting that they lacked any true litigation powers.124  Notably, the 
statute does not outline how or whether the amici should be 
compensated.125  Congress’s decision to make the amicus position 
unpaid allowed Congress to avoid the annual decision of whether to 
fund the amicus pool through the appropriations process.  It also 
allowed Congress to avoid deciding which branch of government the 
                                            
 122. Del Quentin Wilber, U.S. Spy Court Judge Dismissed Privacy Advocate’s Concerns 
About Data Use, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2016, 2:24 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-fisa-court-records-20160419-story.html; see Yael 
Grauer, Senate Shoots down All Bad Amendments to the NSA Reform Bill, WIRED.COM (June 
2, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/senate-shoots-bad-amendments-
nsa-reform-bill (discussing the dangers of Sen. McConnell’s amendments to the bill’s 
“amicus advocate” scheme). 
 123. See Letter from Michael W. Macleod-Ball & Neema Singh Guliani, ACLU, to 
Senators (June 1, 2015) [hereinafter ACLU Letter], https://www.aclu.org/sites/ 
default/files/field_document/usaf_amendment_vote_rec_6-1.pdf (opposing Amendment 
1451, explaining that to repeal the amicus provision would make FISA court amici 
“less likely to serve the important role of protecting privacy and civil liberties”); 
Elizabeth Goitein, The FISC’s Newest Opinion:  Proof of the Need for an Amicus, JUST 
SECURITY (June 23, 2015, 9:43 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/24134/fiscs-newest-
opinion-proof-amicus (criticizing a judge who refuses to hear from amici as not 
acknowledging “any possible argument on the other side,” and stating that judges 
would have heard opposing argument if amicus were there); Farivar, supra note 23 
(stating that “[p]reviously, hearings before the FISC were ex parte, or one sided,” and 
referring to amicus as an “ombudsman or public advocate”). 
 124. See Chad Squitieri, Comment, The Limits of the Freedom Act’s Amicus Curiae, 11 
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 197, 203–04 (2015) (arguing that the FREEDOM Act “falls 
short” in permitting amicus to “meaningfully participate” in decision making because 
they serve at the discretion of the court); Letter from David Cole et al., Constitution 
Project, to Senate Leadership (June 2, 2015), http://www.constitutionproject.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Letter-to-Leadership-re-Opposition-to-Amendment-
1451-to-USAF.pdf (calling the amicus position “already modest”); ACLU Letter, supra 
note 123, at 1 (analyzing the lack of litigation powers of the amici, noting that the 
full discretion remains with the court, and describing the amici position as modest). 
 125. In re Applications of the FBI for Orders Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things, Nos. BR 15-77, BR 15-78, slip op. at 5 n.7 (FISA Ct. June 17, 2015) (noting 
the FREEDOM Act does not outline whether the amicus should be compensated but 
does direct the court to act “expeditiously”); see also Steve Vladeck, “Expense,” “Delay,” 
and the Inauspicious Debut of the USA FREEDOM Act’s Amicus Provision, JUST SECURITY 
(June 23, 2015, 1:19 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/24152/expense-delay-
inauspicious-debut-usa-freedom-acts-amicus-provision (noting that the act of 
switching the public advocate from a governmental entity to an amicus had the effect 
of removing the financial burdens from the government). 
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taxpayer-funded entity sits in, as that decision would have to be answered 
before Congress appropriated any funds for the amicus pool.126 
Considering the quasi-governmental, and untraditional, nature of 
the amicus provision, it is not necessarily clear how the FISC might 
interpret the proper role of the amicus.  The FISC has already 
interpreted some sections of the amicus statute since its enactment in 
2015, however, and one can look to those decisions to see how the 
FISC might interpret the proper role of the amicus.  While it has not 
ruled on the appropriateness of the amicus duty, the FISC has declined 
to involve an amicus, even when the court was presented with a “novel 
or significant” interpretation of law, because the conclusion was 
“obvious” and the appointment would be unnecessary and “not 
appropriate.”127  In another decision in which the FISC did appoint an 
amicus, the judge explained that courts “have broad discretion to 
determine the nature and extent” of amicus participation.128 
These FISC decisions reinforce that the court considers itself the 
ultimate arbiter regarding any amicus participation; even when the 
court found a novel legal question as contemplated by the statute, it 
nonetheless declined to involve an amicus by exercising judicial 
discretion.129 
Pursuant to the statute, the presiding judge of the FISC appointed 
five amici on November 25, 2015, and a sixth amicus effective March 
31, 2016130: 
                                            
 126. See MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44078, JUDICIARY 
APPROPRIATIONS FY2016 5–8 (2015) (listing the types of funds Congress provides 
within the judicial branch).  See generally JESSICA TOLLESTRUP & JAMES V. SATURNO, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42388, THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS:  AN 
INTRODUCTION (2014) (describing the process by which Congress appropriates 
federal funds). 
 127. In re Applications of the FBI, Nos. BR 15-77, BR 15-78, slip op. at 5–6.  This case 
occurred prior to the FISC’s appointment of the amicus pool. 
 128. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things, No. BR 17-75, slip op. at 7–8 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (finding a novel and 
significant interpretation of law was presented, and appointing an amicus curiae, 
while also noting that the court had not yet appointed the amicus pool). 
 129. Goitein, supra note 123 (arguing that the FISC’s decision to not involve an 
amicus in that case was in violation of the statute and Congress’s intent because 
Congress did not mean to make the use of amici optional in all situations). 
 130. Cyrus Farivar, America’s Super-Secret Court Names Five Lawyers as Public Advocates, 
ARS TECNICA (Nov. 28, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/ 
11/americas-super-secret-court-names-five-lawyers-as-public-advocates; Amici Curiae, 
FISC.GOV, http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/amici-curiae (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
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Name Title Organization 
Jonathan G. Cedarbaum131 Partner Law Firm of WilmerHale 
(Washington D.C. office) 
John D. Cline132 Office of John D. Cline Law Office of John D. 
Cline (San Francisco) 
Laura Donohue133 Professor of Law Georgetown Law 
Amy Jeffress134 Partner Law Firm of Arnold & 
Porter (Washington D.C.) 
Marc Zwillinger135 Managing Member ZwillGen PLLC 
(Washington D.C.) 
David S. Kris136 General Counsel Intellectual Ventures 
 
Mr. Jameel Jaffer of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
who appeared before the FISC-R as an amicus in 2002,137 called the 
initial five amici appointees “[a]n impressive list.”138 
                                            
 131. Mr. Cedarbaum worked at the Department of Justice (DOJ); he served as the 
Obama Administration’s Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal 
Counsel.  Farivar, supra note 130. 
 132. Mr. Cline is a criminal defense attorney. Id. 
 133. Ms. Donohue has “written extensively on national security law, privacy, 
Executive Order 12333, and [FISA].” Id. 
 134. Ms. Jeffress is a criminal defense lawyer; she previously worked for the DOJ as 
an Embassy Attaché and was a prosecutor with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
District of Columbia. Id. 
 135. A press statement on Mr. Zwillinger’s firm’s website states that he is a “long-
standing proponent of providing the [FISC], and the Court of Review with an 
alternative perspective to the government’s view.”  Marc Zwillinger, FISC Appoints 
Marc Zwillinger as One of Five Amici Curiae, ZWILLGEN BLOG (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://blog.zwillgen.com/2015/12/03/fisc-appoints-marc-zwillinger-as-one-of-five-
amici-curae.  Zwillinger previously represented Yahoo and appeared before the FISC 
as a private lawyer; as of November 2015, he represented Apple in its attempts to 
resist government pressure to extract data from a seized iPhone in a drug case.  
Farivar, supra note 130. 
 136. Mr. Kris is a former DOJ attorney experienced in national security issues, 
having served as Assistant Attorney General for National Security, and previously as 
Associate Deputy Attorney General, where he focused on issues “including 
supervising the government’s use of [FISA] . . . and assisting the attorney general in 
conducting oversight of the intelligence community.”  David S. Kris, COLUM. L. SCH., 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/hertog-program/events/past-events/david-s-kris (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 137. In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) 
(per curiam). 
 138. Farivar, supra note 130. 
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The FISC-R appointed the first representative from the amicus pool 
to argue in a case that it decided in April 2016.139  The question 
presented to the court concerned the interpretation of another section 
of the U.S. criminal code concerning a FISA judge’s authorization for a 
surveillance order.140  The FISC-R explained that the FISC judge below 
considered “the competing privacy interests” and concluded that the 
privacy interests did not warrant a rejection of the surveillance 
application due to the narrow privacy exposure and ability to mitigate 
the information collected.141  The amicus advocated pro-privacy 
arguments, arguing that technology existed that could allow the 
government to limit information collection, and that there should be a 
more expansive definition of “content”—the FISC-R rejected both 
arguments.142  Expressing disappointment about part of the FISC-R’s 
holding, a pro-privacy commentator stated that the court “dismissed 
the argument of Special Advocate . . . Marc Zwillinger.”143 
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND 
INHERENT COURT AUTHORITY OVER AMICUS 
The FISC amicus pool is the first time that Congress has directed a 
federal court to hear from a private, non-government amicus.  This 
novelty makes it difficult to identify the line between Congress’s 
authority to establish and control the procedures of lower courts 
under Article III and each court’s inherent authority to conduct its 
own affairs as part of an independent judiciary.  However, an 
examination of the separation of powers doctrine, the language of 
the statute itself, the Appointments Clause, and the inherent power 
of the courts help establish that boundary. 
                                            
 139. In re Certified Question of Law, No. FISCR 16-01, slip. op. at 1 (FISA Ct. Rev. 
Apr. 14, 2016) (per curiam).  The FISC-R announced that it appointed the amicus, 
Mr. Marc Zwillinger, under “50 U.S.C. § 1803(i),” id. at 2, so it is unclear whether the 
Court appointed the amicus under § 1803(i)(2)(A), in which amicus mandate 
applies, or § 1803(i)(2)(B), in which amicus mandate does not apply. 
 140. Id. at 3, 5–7. 
 141. Id. at 6–7. 
 142. Id. at 7–8 n.4, 12 n.6. 
 143. Jake Laperruque, A Problematic Psuedo-Category of Surveillance Information and 
Promising Post-Collection Policy, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 25, 2016, 1:38 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/32556/problematic-pseudo-category-surveillance-
information-promising-post-collection-policy (emphasis added) (referring to Marc 
Zwillinger as a “Special Advocate” instead of as merely an amicus). 
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A. Separation of Powers:  The Inherent Judicial Power and Congressional 
Power in Relation to the Courts 
While Congress has never before legislated to place a non-
government, private amicus with a mandated duty into court 
proceedings, jurisprudence exists that draws the line between 
Congress’s authority to establish and control the procedures of lower 
federal courts under Article III and each of those court’s retained, 
inherent authority as a judicial branch entity.144  The FISA amicus 
pool is a legislative creation.145  An analysis of important separation of 
powers conflicts shows that the judicial branch’s retention of the tools 
it needs to discharge its duties limits Congress’s ability to control 
court procedures, such as defining an amicus’s duty. 
The Constitution, under Article III, vests the judicial power with 
the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by Congress.146  
The Constitution also vests Congress with the authority to control the 
lower courts’ size, location, organization, jurisdiction, and procedural 
rules.147  But the judicial power, in essence, is the duty to “say what 
the law is.”148  In fulfilling their obligations, the courts retain the 
inherent judicial powers rooted in the history and the nature of the 
judiciary,149 which are “essential to the administration of justice.”150 
                                            
 144. See NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 7–8 (explaining that courts retain 
certain inherent powers which “broadly allow a federal court to properly function as 
an institution”); Anclien, supra note 9, at 37–39 & n.1 (explaining that the judicial 
power is self-executing, that some powers are inherent in the federal courts by virtue 
of their being judicial bodies, and that the judicial power vests from the Constitution 
and not Congress). 
 145. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803 (West 2015) (authorizing the creation of the FISC and 
FISC-R and, in subsection (i), permitting them to create an amicus pool). 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 147. Anclien, supra note 9, at 39; see also NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 8 
(noting that Congress’s power over the judiciary’s procedures has been described as 
“‘plenary’ in nature”). 
 148. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Anclien, supra 
note 9, at 38 n.2 (defining the judicial power as the “judge’s authority and 
obligation, in all matters over which jurisdiction is conferred, independently, finally, 
and effectually to decide the whole case” (quoting James S. Liebman & William F. 
Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”:  The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of 
Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 771 (1998))). 
 149. Anclien, supra note 9, at 38 n.3 (explaining that powers that “inhere” to the 
judiciary are those which, if absent, would prevent courts from accomplishing “the 
work with which they are entrusted” (quoting Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, 
Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study 
in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1023 (1924))). 
 150. Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. 
Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924) (explaining that the power to hold a party in 
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Congressional and judicial powers regarding the courts are well 
described by Justice Robert Jackson’s separation of powers analysis:  
where Congress is silent on an issue in which it shares authority with 
another branch, that “zone of twilight” invites the other branch to act 
independently; but if Congress has spoken, then the other branch’s 
power is at its “lowest ebb,” only relying “upon [its] own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress 
over the matter.”151  So, if Congress “expressly foreclose[s] a 
procedural tack,” “courts are generally not empowered to disregard 
Congress’s pronouncement.”152 
But, when legislating on the courts, “Congress may not act to 
denigrate the authority of the judicial branch.”153  While the three 
branches do not operate in complete isolation, Congress violates the 
separation of powers doctrine when it seeks to increase its own 
powers at the expense of another branch by “unduly interfering” with 
that branch’s role.154  Congress can unduly interfere by exercising 
power, control, or supervision over an entity that falls under the 
constitutional authority of another branch of government.155  
However, Congress should preserve the functions that are “well 
within the traditional power of the Judiciary[,]” and it should not 
prevent another branch from retaining “sufficient control” to 
accomplish its “constitutionally assigned duties.”156  Essentially, the 
                                            
contempt is one such inherent judicial power, but qualifying that this power can be 
“regulated within limits not precisely defined”). 
 151. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holding that 
“Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess”). 
 152. Anclien, supra note 9, at 40 n.9. 
 153. BAZAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 9; see NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 8–
9 (“Congress’s authority to prescribe procedural rules for federal courts is not 
absolute.  Specifically, Congress’s power over procedure cannot extend so far as to 
erode functions of the federal judiciary that are at the heart of the Article III judicial 
power—namely the ability to independently and impartially resolve a case-or-
controversy with finality.” (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 
(1995)) (footnotes omitted)). 
 154. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 965–66 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that Congress cannot assume 
another branch’s constitutionally entrusted function and exercise powers that are 
not within the legislative function); BAZAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 8 (explaining that 
the Supreme Court tests whether one branch impinges on the core power and 
function of another branch). 
 155. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694–97. 
 156. Id. at 695–96. 
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“legislature cannot exercise . . . judicial power.”157  Courts have 
reinforced that there is a difference between a legislature that 
proscribes procedural rules and one that meddles with a judicial 
function that affects the court’s ability to decide the law. 
B. Inherent Court Authority over the Amicus and the Traditional Role of an 
Amicus 
The cases surrounding the proper amicus role are more an effort 
of judicial self-restraint rather than a separation of powers analysis 
because there are so few statutes that specifically outline amici 
positions in federal courts.  Courts have historically retained inherent 
authority and broad discretion to control the amicus process.158  At 
first, courts hesitated to hear from adversarial amici, viewing them as 
a friend for court advice and not an advocate for one side; but by the 
1990s, “an adversary role of an amicus curiae [had] become 
accepted.”159  Judge Posner outlined a popular list of three 
circumstances when it is appropriate for a court to hear from amici:  
(1) when one party “is not represented competently or is not 
represented at all,” (2) when the amicus “has an interest in some 
other case that may be affected by the decision in the present case,” 
and (3) “when the amicus has unique information or perspective that 
can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties 
are able to provide.”160 
The “bright line test” is another test that many courts employ when 
deciding the appropriate amicus role. It examines whether the 
amicus can control the litigation, and participation must be “solely 
within the broad discretion of the district court.”161  Lacking any 
                                            
 157. Springer v. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928). 
 158. See sources cited supra note 8. 
 159. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 
1997) (Posner, C.J., in chambers) (citing United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 
165 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
 160. Id.; see also Michigan, 940 F.2d at 164–65 (acknowledging that an amicus 
provides information “necessary to the administration of justice”); Miller-Wohl Co. v. 
Comm’r of Labor & Indus., Mont., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that 
the classic role of amicus is to assist in a case of general public interest, supplement 
efforts of counsel, and bring the court’s attention to law that was not considered); 
New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.3 
(1st Cir. 1979) (noting that the amicus aids the court in a matter of law in which it is 
unsure or mistaken (citing 1 JOHN BOUVIER, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (Francis 
Rawle ed., 8th ed. 1914))). 
 161. Waste Mgmt. of Pa., Inc. v. City of York, 162 F.R.D. 34, 36 (M.D. Pa. 1995) 
(citing Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Hanan, 868 F. Supp. 1356, 1358 (M.D. Ala. 1994)). 
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control over the litigation prevents the amicus from rising to the level 
of a named party—it “cannot initiate, create, extend, or enlarge 
issues . . . [and has] no right to appeal or dismiss issues”; however, the 
concept is flexible, and some amici can be more active than others, 
such as participating in discovery and examining and presenting 
witnesses.162  An adversarial amicus is appropriate as long as the 
discretion over the process remains with the court.163 
Further, the Supreme Court held in Universal Oil Products Co. v. 
Root Refining Co.164 that a federal court may, when investigating a 
fraudulent judgment, “avail itself . . . of amici to represent the public 
interest in the administration of justice.”165  But the Court noted that 
although “[a]s a matter of law” the relevant parties in that case were 
only amici, they “stated quite candidly that they were also concerned 
with the interests of their clients.”166  The Court did not find a 
problem with the circuit court appointing the amici to help discover 
fraud, but it warned that the amici “selected by the court to vindicate 
its honor ordinarily ought not be in the service of those having 
private interests.”167  The Court also noted that “a federal court can 
always call on law officers of the United States to serve as amici.”168 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence approves of the appointment of 
amici to undertake courts’ inherent duties and to help preserve “the 
usual safeguards of adversary proceedings.”169  But the Court also clearly 
acknowledged that the amici serve the court, and that their duties to 
private, interested clients can cloud the traditional function and duty of 
                                            
 162. Wyatt, 868 F. Supp. at 1358–60 (allowing a more active amici role for a 
government amici).  Other cases have held that the amici cannot “raise issues not 
advanced by the parties themselves,” United States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 
624 (N.D. Ohio 2012), and that the primary purpose of amici is to advise the court 
and not “to collaterally attack the results or reasoning of a case decided adversely to 
the proposed amicus.”  Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, No. 00-CV-10331-BC, 2002 
WL 33012185, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2002). 
 163. See Michigan, 940 F.2d at 163 (condoning amici that have similar rights to 
traditional parties subject to the court’s discretion). 
 164. 328 U.S. 575 (1946). 
 165. Id. at 581. 
 166. Id. at 578. 
 167. Id. at 581 (explaining that when the amici formally serve the court and are in 
the pay of private interests, the court should not award fees and costs when the amici 
have already been compensated by private clients). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 580; see also Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 380–81 (1955) 
(appointing an amicus curiae to present oral arguments on behalf of a criminal 
defendant when the defendant’s attorney could not present oral arguments). 
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an amicus.170  And courts always retain “broad discretion to determine 
the nature and extent of the participation of an amicus curiae.”171 
Congress has rarely legislated regarding amici in federal courts, 
and when it has, it has legislated regarding public, government 
amici—not private amici.  Government amici are fairly prevalent 
because Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(FRAP) allows the federal government, a federal officer, an agency, 
or a state to file amicus briefs in any case without permission of the 
parties or the court.172  But Rule 29(a) does not say anything about 
private amici, leaving appointment discretion for those amici squarely 
with the federal judge.  One example of Congress legislating for a 
federal amici is in the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), which provides 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) with the right to 
appear as amicus in federal court cases brought under the CEA.173  The 
CFTC is a federal entity—Congress established the CFTC as an agency 
and provided the statutory duties for its officers.174  Another example is 
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which protects federal employees 
from prohibited personnel practices.  The OSC may also appear as an 
amicus in limited circumstances, and Congress authorized specific 
duties for the OSC when appearing as an amicus.175  As with the CFTC, 
Congress created the OSC as an independent executive branch agency 
and gave that entity statutory duties.176  When Congress has codified 
amicus provisions for federal courts, it has previously only legislated to 
create access for potential non-private, government amici who are 
already under its supervision, such as federal entities, agencies, and 
officers.177  It also has not substantively constrained the legal arguments 
                                            
 170. Universal Oil, 328 U.S. at 581; see supra text accompanying notes 165–67.  Lower 
federal courts have also accepted a more adversarial amici role.  Ryan v. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J., in 
chambers) (citing United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
 171. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things, No. BR 15-75, slip op. at 8 n.7 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015); see also Order 
Appointing Amicus Curiae, No. BR 15-99, slip op. at 4 (FISA Ct. Sept. 17, 2015) 
(explaining that for security purposes, amicus curiae are “court personnel”). 
 172. FED. R. APP. P. 29(a). 
 173. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(8)(B) (2012). 
 174. § 2(a)(2). 
 175. 5 U.S.C. § 1212(a)(1), (h)(1) (authorizing the Special Counsel to present its 
views with respect to the statutes related to the OSC’s authority). 
 176. §§ 1211–1212; see also Frazier v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 162 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) (concurring that the duties of Special Counsel come from the statutory 
language and legislative history of the authorizing act). 
 177. See NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 17–18 (noting that the very few 
rules and statutes that mandate that a court hear from an amicus, such as Federal 
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that the amicus could provide other than to authorize a government 
amicus to demonstate its own views.178 
C. Characteristics of Federal Officers and the Appointments Clause 
To help frame a FISA amicus’s role in FISC proceedings, it is 
instructive to analyze other statutory creations for compliance with the 
Appointments Clause.  Positions that comply with the Appointments 
Clause are federal officer positions, and the analysis helps to place the 
FISA amicus in its proper position between all the relevant bodies:  
Congress, the FISA Court, and the DOJ.  The analysis of different 
statutory creations of positions demonstrates that where Congress 
creates an entity and imposes on it a specific duty, that entity is usually 
an executive branch office that contains a full framework of statutory 
provisions—an office within a department, officer positions, an 
appropriations funding regime, duties, and limitations.179 
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution provides for two 
types of federal officers:  “principal” officers, who are appointed by 
the President and confirmed with the advice and consent of the 
Senate,180 and “inferior” officers, who may be appointed by the 
President, courts, or the heads of executive departments.181  An 
“inferior” officer has “certain, limited duties” that are restricted, 
temporary, or purposed to accomplish a single task.182  U.S. officers 
that require compliance with the Appointments Clause exercise 
“significant authority” on behalf of the federal government.183  This 
                                            
Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 29(a) and the amicus statutes regarding the 
CFTC, OSC, and Senate legal counsel, regard government amici and have not been 
judicially accessed, “leaving the constitutional status of a mandatory amicus statute 
judicially unresolved”).  FRAP 29(a) also provides access for states to federal circuit 
courts, but obviously the federal government does not control or seek to control the 
arguments a state would make in an amicus brief.  Neither FRAP 29(a), the CFTC 
amicus provision, nor the OSC amicus provision mention or contemplate non-
governmental amici. 
 178. 5 U.S.C. § 1212(h)(1). 
 179. See infra text accompanying notes 187–95 (examining the statutory framework 
of the DOJ’s National Security Division, which litigates FISA cases before the FISC). 
 180. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988). 
 183. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam) (recognizing that the 
officer definition is meant to include “all persons who can be said to hold an office 
under the government” (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 
(1879)).  See generally Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, DOJ OFF. LEGAL COUNS. (Apr. 16, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default 
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authority includes conducting litigation, as Congress has empowered 
some U.S. officers, both principal and inferior, to control litigation 
on behalf of the government.184 
The DOJ attorneys who represent the FBI and NSA and advocate 
before the FISC are federal officers—Congress created the divisions 
of the DOJ in which they sit, which are subject to the Appointments 
Clause.185  FISA requires applications for orders to be “made by a 
Federal officer in writing.”186 
Additionally, attorneys from the DOJ’s National Security Division 
(NSD) represent the U.S. government before the FISC.187  Congress 
established the NSD within the DOJ to “support . . . the intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government.”188  Congress also outlined the duties, powers, and 
resources of the DOJ lawyers who argue before the FISC.189  At the 
head of the NSD is the Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security.190  DOJ alone conducts litigation on behalf of the United 
States, an agency, or its officers.191  Congress also appropriated 
funds,192 set procedures for removing officers and employees,193 and 
established congressional oversight procedures for DOJ.194  Finally, 
                                            
/files/olc/opinions/2007/04/31/appointmentsclausev10.pdf (explaining that U.S. 
officers exercise authority in a way that can bind the rights of others). 
 184. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (providing that DOJ officers, under the 
direction of the Attorney General, control the “conduct of litigation” in which the 
government is involved). 
 185. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(a) (2015) (defining an “attorney for the government” to 
include Assistant Attorneys General and DOJ-employed attorneys, among others); 
infra notes 187–95 and accompanying text. 
 186. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a). 
 187. Report Describing the Government’s Assessment Whether the End of Bulk 
Collection Has Mooted Claims of Certain Plaintiffs at 17, No. BR 15-99 (FISA Ct. Jan. 
8, 2016) (listing attorneys representing the government in the DOJ’s National 
Security Division and Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch). 
 188. 28 U.S.C. § 509A. 
 189. 28 U.S.C. § 518 (authorizing the Attorney General discretion to conduct and 
argue any case in which the United States is interested, or to delegate such 
responsibility to a DOJ officer); 28 U.S.C. § 530C (authorizing the DOJ to use 
available funds in its own reasonable discretion); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823 (setting out 
the requirements for federal officers when filing FISC order applications). 
 190. 28 U.S.C. § 507A.  Assistant Attorneys General are principal officers, 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  § 506. 
 191. § 516. 
 192. § 524. 
 193. § 528. 
 194. § 522. 
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DOJ lawyers are bound by the same ethical standards as the other 
lawyers in the forum in which they are advocating.195 
Some inferior officers in the executive branch can be appointed by 
the courts but under restrictive conditions.  In Morrison v. Olson,196 the 
Court analyzed whether the Ethics in Government Act—which 
allowed the Attorney General to refer a case to a special division of 
judges, who then appointed an independent counsel—created a 
principal or inferior officer.197  The Court concluded that Congress 
logically placed the appointing authority for the executive branch 
office being analyzed (an office of independent counsel) in the 
judicial branch because of the concern that it might be called upon 
“to investigate its own high-ranking [executive branch] 
officers . . . .”198  The Court noted, however, that the appointing 
judges would be “ineligible to participate in any matters relating” to 
the office they had appointed to ensure the process did not “run 
afoul of the constitutional limitation on ‘incongruous’ interbranch 
appointments.”199  As a result, the judiciary can appoint inferior 
officers in the executive branch, but those officers cannot then 
participate in the same proceedings as the judges who appoint them. 
While there are no other instances of Congress creating a private 
amicus pool, there are some examples of legislatively-created entities 
that are not necessarily under the control of that legislature.  When 
acting under the False Claims Act (FCA), qui tam relators200 are not 
U.S. officers because there is no legislatively created office, they are 
not entitled to benefits or salary, and they are not subject to the 
Appointments Clause or other notions of tenure or duties conferred 
on federal officers.201  Thus, qui tam relators—whether they begin the 
                                            
 195. § 530B. 
 196. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 197. Id. at 660, 670–71. 
 198. Id. at 677. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Qui tam relators are “private citizens” who “come forward with information 
about entities defrauding federal programs to allow the government a chance to 
recover stolen funds” and file lawsuits “on behalf of the government.”  What Does Qui 
Tam Mean?, WHISTLEBLOWER ATT’YS, https://www.whistleblowerattorneys.com/ 
whistleblower-faqs/qui-tam (last visited Nov. 30, 2016) (explaining that the relators 
are also entitled to receive a financial reward). 
 201. U.S. ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 805–06 (10th Cir. 
2002) (further holding that the qui tam relators do not violate the separation of 
powers because the executive branch retains the ability to intervene in the lawsuit, 
and thus it preserves sufficient control to fulfill its constitutional duties in 
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whistleblowing process as federal employees, contractors, or in 
another role—are not federal officers when acting under the FCA.  
The statute does not impose on them substantive duties—only 
procedural restrictions.202 
Another example comes from the state court level.  A Texas Family 
Code statute authorizes courts to appoint attorneys to assist the court as 
amici in child custody cases.203  The statute creates duties and 
instructions for the amicus, which include advocating for the child’s best 
interest.204  But an appellate court held that the amicus’s role was only to 
provide legal services necessary to assist the court in protecting the child’s 
best interest—not to provide legal services to the child.205  This holding 
reiterates the role of the amicus when it is supposedly representing the 
rights of non-participating parties:  the amicus is not appointed to 
represent the child or parents—it is responsible to the court, not the parties, 
and owes a duty of competent representation only to the court.206  Even 
though the state legislature codified a specific amicus position, role, and 
duty to a non-present and interested party in the litigation, the court 
held that the amicus still only owed a duty to the court.207  These cases 
demonstrate that non-party participants in legal proceedings need clear, 
specified roles, and that there is a difference between a statute for a 
public amicus who is already a federal officer responsive to Congress 
and a private amici responsive only to the court. 
D. Statutory Interpretation:  The Rule of Non-superfluous Language, the 
Disjunctive “Or,” and the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
Finally, three theories of statutory construction help guide the 
interpretation of the ambiguous FISA amicus provision.  The FISC can 
read the amicus-duty provision of the statute broadly, so as not to restrict 
the amicus in any way, or narrowly, so as to require the amicus to follow 
the direction to support pro-privacy arguments.  First, the statutory 
interpretation canon encourages courts to read legislative language non-
superfluously.  Second, the canon of constitutional avoidance explains 
how courts deal with ambiguous language that implicates constitutional 
                                            
compliance with Morrison), rev’d, 92 F. App’x 708 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom, 
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). 
 202. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012). 
 203. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.003, 107.005 (West 2015). 
 204. § 107.005. 
 205. Zeifman v. Nowlin, 322 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.; see Anderson, supra note 8, at 397 (“Regardless of what the rules say, 
courts always retain inherent powers to appoint amicus curiae.”). 
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concerns with a statute.  Third, this section explains the different uses of 
the word “or” when listing items in a statute. 
A fundamental principle in statutory interpretation is the rule that 
language should be construed to be non-superfluous.208  This 
principle requires courts to “give effect, if possible, to every clause 
and word of a statute, avoiding . . . any construction which implies 
that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it 
employed.”209  Courts look to the legislative history of the statute to 
guide their interpretation of questionable language.210  They should 
also consider the congressional language in context,211 and they 
should assume that Congress used the distinct terms “very 
deliberately” by intending to add something to the meaning and 
purpose of the statute.212  Consequently, when Congress amends a 
statute, “it must intend to change the statute’s meaning.”213 
The canon of non-superfluous words, however, is in tension with 
the canon of constitutional avoidance when a statute implicates a 
constitutional concern and the only constitutional reading might 
                                            
 208. EIG, supra note 25, at 13–14. 
 209. Id. (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)).  The statute 
should be read to give effect “to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative 
or superfluous, void or insignificant.”  Id. at 13–14 (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 
88, 101 (2004)). 
 210. See Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 
704–06 (1995) (relying on committee transcripts from both the House and Senate 
for the meaning of “take” under the Endangered Species Act); Wilder v. Virginia 
Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 515 (1990) (referring to a Senate report for evidence of 
the primary intent of the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act); Shell Oil Co. v. 
Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 26 (1988) (looking only to the legislative history 
of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to determine the purpose of that act). 
 211. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 
581, 596 (2004)). 
 212. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 315 (2009).  The FISC-R has recently 
provided instruction on statutory interpretation, looking at “[b]oth the text and the 
legislative history” of a statute, including the congressional record statements of the 
statute’s author.  In re Certified Question of Law, No. FISCR 16-01, slip op. at 14–16 
(FISA Ct. Rev. Apr. 14, 2016) (per curiam).  The FISC-R added “where words are 
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or 
in the law of this country they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless 
the context compels to the contrary.” Id. at 15 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 
575, 583 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The FISC-R stated that its duty 
is to construe statutes in context with their overall statutory structure, and it is “to 
avoid interpreting one statutory provision in a manner that would render another 
provision superfluous.”  Id. at 16 (citing Corley, 556 U.S. at 314). 
 213. EIG, supra note 25, at 14 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 333, 336 
(1992)). 
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render some statutory language to be meaningless.  The 
constitutional avoidance canon “comes into play only when, after the 
application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be 
susceptible of more than one construction; and the [constitutional 
avoidance] canon functions as a means of choosing between them.”214  
When a statute may be interpreted in more than one plausible way, 
courts should defer to a reading assuming that the legislature 
intended for it to be constitutional.215 
Another component to statutory interpretation is the effect of the 
word “or” when used to separate elements in a list.  The use of an 
“or” might mean that only one of the listed elements must be 
satisfied,216 but “or” can also be disjunctive and create “mutually 
exclusive” elements that prevent “mixing and matching.”217  Courts 
do not “inexorably” apply the different effects of a legislature’s choice 
of “or” versus “and”; rather, courts are flexible to avoid frustrating 
“evident legislative intent” and statutory context.218  Considering 
congressional intent and the relevant statutory canons of 
construction, the amicus duty provision of FISA should be read 
broadly to allow amici from the pool to advance any view that might 
be helpful to the court, not just pro-privacy views. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL ENCROACHMENT ON THE FISC’S INHERENT 
AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THE AMICUS DUTY WOULD VIOLATE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
A. Proscribing Procedural Rules Is Properly Within Congress’s 
Constitutional Authority, but Acting as the Gatekeeper for Which Arguments 
the Court Can Consider When Deciding Novel and Significant Interpretations 
of Law Is Purely a Judicial Power Function 
If Congress cannot grant powers to an executive officer that it does 
not itself possess,219 then it logically follows that Congress cannot 
grant to a private, non-government amicus powers it does not possess.  
                                            
 214. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005).  But see id. at 400 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (noting a “disturbing number” of cases in which the Supreme Court has 
applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to statutes that “were on their face 
clear”). 
 215. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 216. EIG, supra note 25, at 9. 
 217. Id. at 9 n.43 (citing United States v. Williams, 326 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 
2003)). 
 218. Id. at 9. 
 219. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
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The amicus duty to support arguments that advance privacy and civil 
liberties, if narrowly interpreted, functions to curtail the court-amicus 
relationship by preventing the amicus from providing the court with 
potentially helpful pro-surveillance arguments.220  The court appoints 
a FISA amicus to help it interpret novel and significant legal issues,221 
and the court’s essential constitutional function is to interpret the law 
and effectually decide the case or controversy.222  To do so, the court 
must properly determine the legal issues in question. 
Congress possesses significant and important authority over the 
FISC, but this authority is limited223 and should track the same 
authority that Congress possesses over other Article III tribunals that 
it has established.  Congress created the FISC, and in many instances 
before the FREEDOM ACT, it properly prescribed substantive and 
procedural rules for the court’s operations.  For example, the FISA 
statute contains procedural rules for government applications for 
orders;224 issuance of orders; determination of probable cause; 
specifications and directions of orders; duration, review, and 
extensions of orders; and issuance of emergency orders.225  These 
rules properly exercise congressional power to create the substantive 
law and to outline the jurisdiction and procedural rules for a court.  
They resemble the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal 
Procedure, and Evidence.  Because Congress has spoken, it would be 
improper for the court to ignore those rules.226 
Accordingly, the FISA amicus provision should align with 
jurisprudence on the appropriate role of an amicus in an Article III 
court and, in many ways, it does so align.  First, there is nothing 
inappropriate about an adversarial amicus.227  The potential for a 
FISA amicus to be adversarial to the government is thus proper and 
                                            
 220. The potential that a FISA amicus would present a pro-surveillance argument 
is real, considering that Mr. Davis S. Kris, the former DOJ Assistant Attorney General 
for National Security, is now a FISA pooled amicus.  See supra note 136. 
 221. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(i)(2) (West 2015). 
 222. See supra text accompanying notes 146–50. 
 223. NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 8 (“Congress’s authority to prescribe 
procedural rules for federal courts is not absolute.”). 
 224. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2012). 
 225. § 1805. 
 226. See Anclien, supra note 9, at 40 n.9 (explaining that when Congress has 
“expressly foreclosed a procedural track, courts are generally not empowered to 
disregard Congress’s pronouncement”). 
 227. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J., in chambers) (citing United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 
143, 165 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
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was an obvious purpose for enacting the provision.228  Second, the 
statute properly prevents the amicus from possessing any litigation 
powers229 that would violate the “bright-line” test and make the 
amicus resemble an involved party.230  Third, the amicus is appointed 
to help the court interpret “novel and significant” legal issues, which 
helps to provide the court with a unique perspective231 in its effort to 
properly consider law232 and administer justice.233 
But there is a difference between a procedural rule and a filter that 
determines which arguments the court can consider when 
interpreting the law.  Here, Congress did not “foreclose[] a 
procedural tack”;234 rather, it established one to appoint amici and 
then meddled with the scope and contents of the legal arguments the 
amici can provide to the court.  Congress creates the law, but to limit 
the process of interpreting the law would be an infringement on the 
power of the judicial branch235 by unduly interfering236 with a judge’s 
consideration of legal arguments.  If read narrowly,237 the amicus duty 
                                            
 228. See 161 CONG. REC.  S3396–97 (daily ed. June 1, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Blumenthal) (arguing that the amici would present the “side opposing the 
government,” functioning to protect “our rights and liberties because [they] would 
be public advocates protecting constitutional rights” who also defend the liberties of 
surveillance targets). 
 229. See Squitieri, supra note 124, at 203–10 (criticizing the amicus pool’s weakness 
because of its lack of participation in litigation). 
 230. Waste Mgmt. of Pa., Inc. v. City of York, 162 F.R.D. 34, 36 (M.D. Pa. 1995) 
(citing Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Hanan, 868 F. Supp. 1356, 1358 (M.D. Ala. 1994)). 
 231. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063. 
 232. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm’r of Labor & Indus., Mont., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
 233. United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 234. Anclien, supra note 9, at 40 n.9. 
 235. BAZAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 9. 
 236. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 658 (1988). 
 237. The narrow interpretation of “supporting individual privacy and civil 
liberties,” coupled with the legislative intent to provide opposing arguments to the 
government’s position, holds that the amicus cannot provide arguments that support 
intelligence collection and oppose privacy interests.  Senator Blumenthal’s statement 
that the amicus would safeguard the liberties of surveillance targets, 161 CONG. REC.  
S3396–97 (daily ed. June 1, 2015) (statement of Sen. Blumenthal), evinces the 
intention that supporting intelligence collection and defending the privacy of the 
intelligence targets are logically opposite arguments.  Senators Cornyn and Hatch 
voiced this interpretation during the Senate floor debate.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 110–11.  The Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts also expressed this view in detail, worrying that the amicus 
would disrupt the court’s function and necessarily be adversarial to the government.  
161 CONG. REC. S3420 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (letter from Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts dated May 4, 2015).  Further, an internal Republican Senate 
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deprives the court of an argument it might deem appropriate and 
helpful in considering the interpretation of pertinent law.  Even 
though the FISC retains ultimate discretion over whether to hear from 
an amicus, once it has decided to hear from one,238 it is necessarily 
doing so as a part of its duty to interpret the law.239  No legislative 
branch authority exists under the Constitution to, at that point, 
interfere with the process.240 
Congress reaches the limits of its constitutional powers by 
prescribing the procedures through which a court can exercise its 
existing and inherent authority to hear from an amicus.241  Once the 
court decides to hear from a FISA pool amicus to help interpret the 
law, it exercises a traditional judiciary power to then decide the law.242  
Any congressional interference in that process risks depriving the 
court of the control it requires to accomplish its constitutionally 
                                            
staff memorandum in support of Senator McConnell’s Amendment 1451 to remove 
the amicus provision interpreted the amicus role as “not . . . dispassionate” but “rather 
a third party given a specific substantive argument to make before the court.”  Wittes, supra note 
109 (emphasis added).  The broad interpretation of the duty, supported by Senator 
Blumenthal, holds that the words that “support individual privacy and civil liberties” 
are so broad as to allow the amicus to make any appropriate argument to the court:  
pro-surveillance, anti-surveillance, or somewhere in the middle.  See supra text 
accompanying note 116.  Under the broad reading, the duty would then be 
superfluous because it would hold no meaning.  The amicus and the court would have 
the exact same relationship as if the statute did not contain the words in question. 
 238. In this situation, the court is expressly asking a specific expert for his or her 
assistance with a legal question.  This demonstrates the unique nature of the 
relationship between the court and the amicus.  See Lyle Denniston, Constitution 
Check:  A Privacy Advocate at the Secret Spying Court?, CONSTITUTION DAILY (May 7, 
2015), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/05/constitution-check-a-privacy-adv 
ocate-at-the-secret-spying-court (“The amicus is meant to advocate for the protection 
of civil liberties and privacy, educate the court on intelligence collection or 
communications technologies, and answer any questions the court may have . . . .”). 
 239. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 160 (discussing Judge Posner’s 
three circumstances in which a court hears from an amicus). 
 240. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 241. See NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 8–9 (noting how Congress’s 
authority to make procedural rules is not absolute—it cannot work to erode the 
functions of the federal judiciary). 
 242. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 965–66 (1983) (asserting that Congress 
cannot assume another branch’s constitutionally entrusted function and exercise 
powers that are not within its legislative function). 
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assigned functions.243  Control of arguments before a court is a purely 
judicial power within the judge’s discretion.244 
There are two counterarguments to the statutory interpretation 
that the amicus duty prevents the amicus from supporting pro-
surveillance positions.  The first counterargument is as follows:  the 
FISA amicus’s mandate is written broadly, requiring the amicus to 
advocate in support of generalized pro-privacy and civil liberties 
principles, and such an innocent and non-controversial mandate 
does not unduly interfere with the court’s authority—especially 
because the court retains authority to appoint and remove the 
amicus.245  But this argument ignores several key points:  (1) the 
canon of non-superfluous reading of statutes and the context and 
purpose of the statute’s enactment; and (2) the practical sequence of 
the impact the amicus mandate could have when applied.  The 
second counterargument is that Congress’s use of “or” in the statute 
allows an amicus to couch a pro-privacy argument under other 
subsections of the amicus duty list, as opposed to the subsection that 
specifically addresses privacy and civil liberty issues.246 
A FISA judge would be presented with two options if an amicus 
presented arguments that violated the statutory amicus duty to 
support privacy and civil liberties.  First, the judge could decline to 
consider the arguments because they violate the amicus’s statutory 
duty.  Second, the judge could accept consideration of the pro-
surveillance arguments under one of two lines of reasoning:  (1) by 
interpreting the statute language so broadly to render the amicus 
duty superfluous or by rendering the amicus duty irrelevant due to an 
unrelated statutory catch-all, or (2) by holding that the mandate 
violates the separation of powers by infringing on the court’s 
authority to control the amicus process.  Either way, the judge will 
need to decide whether to consider the arguments. 
                                            
 243. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. 
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
 244. Cf. United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1978) (citations 
omitted) (holding that the trial court has “broad discretion” in controlling closing 
arguments, and explaining that appeal courts will examine whether the argument in 
question implicated constitutional concerns); United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712, 713 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the trial court has “broad discretion in controlling the 
scope of closing argument”); Franklin v. Shelton, 250 F.2d 92, 99 (10th Cir. 1957) 
(holding that “matters related to final argument” are within the discretion of the judge). 
 245. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(i)(2) (West 2015). 
 246. See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text. 
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Neither option is desirable, however, because the first choice 
ignores congressional intent and the second choice requires 
declaring a statute unconstitutional, a decision which courts are 
hesitant to make.  But the first choice is less undesirable than the 
second because the amicus process and the practice of regulating 
arguments in a proceeding are already so engrained within the 
judicial power.  While this Comment argues the broad reading—that 
the statutory requirement that the amicus advance arguments in 
support of privacy and civil liberties could also include a pro-
surveillance argument—is incorrect, it does concede that such a 
reading is, at least, defensible.  And the constitutional avoidance 
canon holds that when two readings are possible, and one reading 
implicates a constitutional concern, then the court should employ 
the other interpretation.247  Both counterarguments end-run this 
analysis by presuming the judge will simply interpret the statute 
broadly and not even consider the constitutional implications of the 
statute that Congress enacted.  While the broad reading is, in the 
end, facially acceptable, the separation of powers analysis is still 
necessary because Congress acted with specific intent and its 
intrusion on the judicial function should not be overlooked. 
The first counterargument is that the words “advance the 
protection of individual privacy and civil liberties” are so broad that 
they could include extremely pro-surveillance arguments.248  The 
argument follows that notwithstanding the plain meaning of the 
language of that subsection, the court retains the ability to remove an 
amicus or appoint another.  This interpretation is a stretch, however, 
for two reasons.  First, the mandate was clearly added to address the 
problem of the FISC proceedings’ non-adversarial nature.249  To 
ignore Congress’s intention that the amicus be adversarial to the 
government would ignore Senator Blumenthal’s—one of the chief 
authors of the FREEDOM Act—defense of the amici pool on the 
Senate floor as individuals who “would be public advocates protecting 
public constitutional rights” and would “present[] the side opposing the 
government.” 250  Congress clearly meant for the amicus to argue 
                                            
 247. See supra text accompanying note 215. 
 248. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(i)(4)(A).  To support this interpretation, the language 
must cover even the most extreme pro-surveillance arguments because if the 
language restricts even one argument that a court might consider helpful in deciding 
the law, then the separation of powers has been infringed. 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 110–12. 
 250. 161 Cong. Rec. S3396–97 (daily ed. June 1, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Blumenthal) (emphasis added). 
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against the government.  Second, even though the FISC judge retains 
the power to appoint and remove the amicus, once appointed, the 
amicus is still supposedly bound by the statutory duty.  The judge may 
be able to remove the amicus, but if he or she appoints an amicus to 
hear the amicus’s point of view, then removal power does not really 
solve the problem created by a statutory restriction on the amicus’s 
available arguments.  The judge must be able to free the amicus of its 
restriction if the amicus wants to present an argument that might 
violate its duty.  When a judge considers novel and significant 
interpretations of the law, he or she wants to hear the amicus’s 
argument.251  Such interpretations necessarily impact the court’s 
ability to discharge its judicial function to decide the case.  While the 
broad interpretation is a stretch, in the end, it is defensible enough 
to avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional in the event that an 
amicus provided a very pro-privacy argument. 
The second counterargument to the interpretation that the statute 
restricts the amicus’s actions is that subsections (A) through (C) of 50 
U.S.C. § 1803(i)(4) are separated by a disjunctive “or.”  Specifically, in 
the three subsections (A), (B), and (C), Congress speaks clearly about 
three separate substantive topics in each possible choice that it offers to 
the amicus:  subsection (A) regards “individual privacy and civil 
liberties”;252 subsection (B) regards “intelligence collection or 
communications technology”;253 and subsection (C) regards “any other 
area relevant to the issue presented to the court.”254  Because these 
subsections are separated with an “or,” a possible reading of the statute 
could interpret it as a disjunctive “or” that allows virtually any pro-privacy 
argument to fall under subsections (B) or (C), thus not violating 
subsection (A).  Such an interpretation is not, however, obvious. 
 Regardless, this drafting and structural choice should not be used 
as a loophole to justify the idea that Congress did not intend the 
amicus, when arguing privacy issues, to espouse pro-privacy 
arguments—it clearly did so intend.  If the amicus offers arguments 
regarding the issues of “privacy and civil liberties,” then the amicus is 
squarely within the category, or sphere, of subsection (A) and must 
follow the requirement to “advance” those interests.255  Subsection 
                                            
 251. See Denniston, supra note 238. 
 252. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(i)(4)(A). 
 253. § 1803(i)(4)(B). 
 254. § 1803(i)(4)(C) (emphasis added). 
 255. This interpretation is held by the Republican senators that supported 
Amendment 1451 and by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts.  See supra text accompanying notes 106–12. 
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(C) should not be seen as a “catch all” because it refers to “any other 
area,”256 signifying that Congress meant to address areas “other” than 
privacy, civil liberties, intelligence collection, or communications 
technology, which are enumerated in subsections (A) and (B).  The 
use of “or” to separate the different subsections is logical because not 
every amicus would necessarily discuss both privacy issues under 
subsection (A) and technology issues under subsection (B).  The use 
of “and” instead of “or” would have seemingly disqualified an amicus 
that did not present arguments under both subsections (A) and (B).  
Notably, for subsection (A), the statute directs the amicus to 
“advance” the interests in that category.257  Comparatively, in 
subsections (B) and (C), the statute uses the less partisan words 
“related to” and “relevant to,” respectively.258  Accordingly, the 
subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(4) should be read as mutually 
exclusive categories because an interpretation that would allow an 
anti-privacy argument under subsections (B) or (C), in violation of 
subsection (A), would “frustrate evident legislative intent.”259 
 If the amicus is going to provide legal arguments on privacy and 
civil liberties, Congress’s choice of words is clear, and the controlling 
language is found in subsection (A).  The statute distinguishes the 
priority to “advance” the enumerated topics in subsection (A), as 
opposed to the purposefully different and less directive language 
used for the other topics in subsections (B) and (C).  The broad 
interpretation of subsection (A), while suspect, is more defensible 
than the argument that a pro-privacy argument can somehow be 
couched under subsections (B) or (C). 
Ironically, the mandate’s intrusion on the traditional judicial role is 
best demonstrated by reviewing the original purpose of the FISA 
amicus and amici roles in general:  to provide the court with alternate 
and diverse points of view.260  There is thus no rationale for Congress 
to restrict in any way the range of arguments the FISA court may hear 
from the pool of amici; in fact, hearing divergent arguments from 
two amici may benefit the court by illuminating a particular 
controversy.  If Congress had not included the amicus duty, each 
                                            
 256. § 1803(i)(4) (emphasis added). 
 257. § 1803(i)(4)(A). 
 258. § 1803(i)(4)(B)–(C). 
 259. See EIG, supra note 25, at 9 (explaining that courts will read “or” in a way that 
does not “frustrate evident legislative intent”). 
 260. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that one of three reasons a court should accept an amicus brief is 
when the amicus provides “unique information or perspective”). 
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amicus would still be fully able to advocate for individual privacy and 
civil liberties.  But they would also be free to agree with the 
government’s arguments or even concur and offer different 
reasoning, which could further the FISA judge’s ability to properly 
discharge his or her judicial function and interpret important legal 
issues regarding national security and individual privacy.  Thus, the 
statute requires one to ignore the existence of the mandate, to read it 
so broadly that it is rendered useless, or to hold that it violates the 
separation of powers doctrine by infringing on the court’s 
relationship with the amicus. 
B. The FISA Amicus Only Owes a Duty to the Court 
Analyzing the duties of each involved party and branch of 
government further illuminates the separation-of-powers analysis.  
Here, Congress has legislated to create a pseudo-court entity, has 
prescribed procedures for that entity to appear, and has then 
exercised control over which arguments that entity can provide to the 
court.  But the amicus is not, and should not be, beholden to a 
congressionally outlined argument restriction.261  As Senator 
Blumenthal eventually stated during congressional consideration of 
the FREEDOM Act, the amicus’s duty “is to enlighten the court.”262  
Notably, when challenged on the amicus provision, the supporters 
did not defend the pro-privacy language.263  The framers essentially 
hid behind the provision’s limited language, claiming the language 
did not require the amicus to oppose the government.  But the 
framers never made any reference to the use of the “or” to separate 
the amicus duties, never provided any reasons for why they selected 
the employed pro-privacy language, and never gave any reasons why 
that language could be ignored. 
                                            
 261. But see NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 18 (acknowledging that 
Congress raises “prudential questions” when it defines what an amicus can say to a 
court, but arguing that a FISA amicus’s duty to advance individual privacy and civil 
liberties “would appear to align with even the most restricted views on the 
appropriate scope of what an amicus can discuss in briefing to a court”).  The 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) interprets the statutory language very broadly 
here, essentially rendering the phrase superfluous.  See infra Part IV.  CRS does not 
cite any authority for defining the proper scope of an amicus briefing.  Further, CRS 
misses the point:  the issue is not the appropriate scope of an amicus briefing but 
whether Congress can define and restrict that scope. 
 262. 161 CONG. REC. S3430–31 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Blumenthal). 
 263. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
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That the amicus owes no duty to Congress or the executive branch 
is partially demonstrated by the fact that the amicus is not a federal 
officer and does not need to comply with the Appointments Clause.  
That the amicus does not need to comply with the Appointments 
Clause is not an attack on its constitutionality; rather, it is evidence 
that this position is unlike similar legislatively-created entities that 
contain duties and that might appear in federal courts.  The amicus is 
neither a principal nor an inferior federal officer because it does not 
exercise significant authority on behalf of the federal government, it 
does not bind the rights of others, and it does not control the 
litigation.264  Further, if the amicus were an inferior federal officer, it 
would violate Morrison because the FISC judges appoint the amicus, 
and then the amicus participates in matters directly related to the 
court that appointed it.265 
Comparatively, DOJ’s NSD officers are federal officers within the 
executive branch who are subject to the Appointments Clause266 and 
to whom Congress properly gave statutory duties.  They litigate on 
behalf of the government and the people,267 operating within specific 
statutory mandates and subject to congressional oversight.268  
Similarly, the judicial employees of the federal courts are federal 
officers, in offices created by Congress, and subject to congressional 
oversight and funding.269 
DOJ attorneys and the amicus curiae that Congress envisioned to 
counter the attorneys’ arguments before the FISC are thus very 
                                            
 264. See NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 14 n.143 (noting that while a 
court’s appointment of an amicus could raise a separation-of-powers question, it does 
not raise questions regarding the Appointments Clause); see also Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (discussing factors courts consider in determining 
whether an officer is “inferior” or “principal”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 
(1976) (per curiam) (holding that an appointed officer wielding “significant 
authority” is deemed an officer); supra Section II.C (discussing federal officers). 
 265. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 (implying that a judicial entity considering 
arguments from an inferior officer that it appointed would “run[] afoul of the 
constitutional limitation on ‘incongruous’ interbranch appointments”). 
 266. 28 U.S.C. § 506 (2012). 
 267. The DOJ’s website quotes Thomas Jefferson:  “‘The most sacred of the duties 
of government [is] to do equal and impartial justice to all its citizens.’  This sacred 
duty remains the guiding principle for the women and men of the U.S. Department 
of Justice.” About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/about (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 268. § 522. 
 269. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts and the role of its director, officers, and 
employees). 
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different in nature and creation, which is telling about the different 
duties owed by each.  Other than codifying the procedure by which the 
amicus can be heard, Congress does not possess any enumerated 
constitutional authority over the amicus through which to exert 
control over its conversations with the court.  Comparatively, 
Congress’s authority over DOJ’s NSD is clearly rooted in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause,270 which allows Congress to create DOJ offices to 
litigate matters on behalf of the government, such as surveillance 
orders under a statutory framework.  But the constitutional origin of 
Congress’s authority to control the amicus is less clear. 
The Constitutional Authority Statement submitted with the 
FREEDOM Act found Congress’s authority to enact the statutory 
provisions under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.271  While this source of authority may be true for most provisions 
in the Act, it is unclear why either of those clauses would necessitate a 
congressional intrusion into the court-amicus relationship.  The amicus 
is a judicial entity, and it necessarily and properly functions to support 
the judicial branch.  The executive branch can advance its judicial 
objectives through the DOJ, and Congress’s role is to create the 
substantive law and provide for the court structure.  Control over the 
amicus’s arguments is not necessary or proper by Congress or by the 
executive branch.  Even further, it is unclear why either of those clauses 
would be more important than preserving the inherent judicial 
authority, which includes control of the amicus process and is protected 
by the separation-of-powers doctrine. 
In reality, the FISA amici are comparable to the qui tam relators of 
the False Claims Act.  They are private individuals who are not federal 
employees or public officers and can participate in a quasi-
representational way in federal court proceedings.272  Qui tam 
relators have been held not to be federal officials273 because the FCA 
preserves the government’s right to take control of the litigation for 
itself if it chooses.274  The preference of the court in United States ex 
rel. Stone v. Rockwell International Corp. was to preserve the executive 
branch’s power to control litigation on its own behalf, not to control 
the qui tam relator’s interest or to narrow the court’s ability to 
                                            
 270. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 271. See Constitutional Authority Statement of H.R. 2048, supra note 94. 
 272. What Does Qui Tam Mean?, supra note 200. 
 273. U.S. ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 805 (10th Cir. 2002), 
rev’d, 92 F. App’x 708 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom, Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United 
States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). 
 274. Id. at 806. 
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communicate with a qui tam relator.275  The only statutory 
requirements of the qui tam relators are procedural; there are no 
substantive restrictions on what arguments they can make to the 
court.276  The FREEDOM Act similarly preserves the government’s 
ability to be the sole party who can litigate before the court with 
respect to the rights of the public.277 
The statute establishing the FISA amicus differs from other statutes 
regarding amicus appointments because the other statutes regard 
government amici who are federal officers already subject to 
congressional oversight and executive branch control.278  But the FISA 
amicus should only be subject to judicial control.  The provision is 
more akin to the Texas child welfare amicus statute.  The Texas 
provision’s structure is analogous to the amici pool, where a statute 
requires a court to hear from an amicus and imposes on that private 
amicus specific duties to advocate for the best interests of a non-
present party.279  But a state appellate court made clear that the amicus 
owes a duty only to the court and not to the child or the parents even 
though in those controversies there are specific and identifiable 
parties.280  The same relationship applies with the FISA amicus. 
The FISA court appoints the amicus, and there is no reason 
Congress or any other entity should limit the amicus’s arguments.  
The scope of the amicus’s arguments should only be guided by the 
court and the amicus himself or herself.  Some amici request to 
appear on behalf of an interested, non-present client, and others are 
appointed by the court to help it discharge its duties.281  Even when 
the amicus represents an interested client, there is debate about 
whether the amicus owes a duty to its client or the court.282  And 
when the court seeks out and appoints an amicus, no matter the 
court’s reasoning, ultimately the amicus is going to owe a duty to 
                                            
 275. Id. at 806–07. 
 276. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2012). 
 277. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(i)(4) (West 2015) (identifying no statutory power of the 
amici to litigate). 
 278. NOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 77, at 17–18 (noting that the constitutional 
status of congressional statutes requiring courts to hear from government amici is 
judicially unsettled). 
 279. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.003, 107.005 (West 2015). 
 280. Zeifman v. Nowlin, 322 S.W.3d 804, 808–09 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). 
 281. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 363 (explaining the difference between amici 
who request to appear on behalf of clients and those who are specifically requested 
and appointed by the court). 
 282. See id. at 363–64 (stating that courts sometimes complain that private amici 
should owe a duty to the court at all times and not to their private clients). 
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himself or herself—if an individual—or the organization itself—if a 
company or other association. 
For example, when the FISC-R appointed the ACLU and NACDL 
to proffer arguments in 2002, it did so because the government was the 
only party to the proceeding, and the case raised “important questions 
of statutory interpretation, and constitutionality.”283  Probably, the 
FISC-R chose those two organizations because they are vocal advocates 
for privacy, civil liberty, and due process rights, and the court wanted 
to hear supportive arguments for those interests in that case.  But 
ultimately, only those organizations are going to decide for themselves 
which arguments to proffer284 and then the court will decide whether it 
finds those arguments helpful or not.  The difference with a FISA 
amicus is that, unlike an amicus with an interested client, it has no 
client; unlike advocacy organizations, like the ACLU and NACDL, it 
has no board of directors and officers; all it has is a questionable duty 
imposed by Congress and whatever expertise and opinions the amicus 
himself or herself possesses.  There is no reason that Congress should 
be able to narrow the scope of the argument between the individual, 
private amicus, and the court.  The FISC will have presumably, like the 
FISC-R did in 2002, selected an amicus for a specific reason and will 
specifically want to hear his or her opinion.  At that point, 
congressional input on the scope of the argument is improper, and 
groups such as the ACLU would likely protest a congressional statute 
that interfered with the scope of arguments it could present to courts 
as an amicus in typical court proceedings. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has cautioned about the dangers of 
having private amici, with private clients, representing interests 
before a court seeking to vindicate the truth.285  While there is 
nothing wrong with having an amicus represent a non-present party’s 
interest,286 it is clear that when government amici appear before 
                                            
 283. In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) 
(per curiam). 
 284. While the ACLU does advocate on behalf of public rights, it is still an 
incorporated non-profit organization with a board of directors, officers, and staff 
attorneys who presumably make the decisions regarding which cases to take and 
which arguments to proffer.  Officers & Board of Directors, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/ 
officers-board-directors (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).  The National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) also has a governance scheme with a board of 
directors, officers, and an executive committee.  Governance, NACDL, 
https://www.nacdl.org/governance (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
 285. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1946). 
 286. This was, in fact, the reason for the appearance of the amici in Universal Oil, 
id. at 578, and was one of Judge Posner’s three reasons for appointing an amicus.  
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courts, they are acting in their official capacities, and when private 
amici appear, they may be acting in furtherance of their client’s 
interests.287  But when, as here, the court itself is choosing the amicus 
and specifically requesting its assistance to interpret the law, the 
amicus’s duty to the court should be unvarnished and unobstructed 
by any other interest.  For example, one of the FISA amici, Mr. Marc 
Zwillinger, represents Yahoo in a private capacity and filed a FISC 
brief in that capacity after the FISC appointed him to the pool.288  As 
an amicus, Mr. Zwillinger should not be entrusted with a duty to 
“protect[] public constitutional rights,”289 which would be necessarily 
complicated by his existing and already competing duties to both his 
private clients and the court.  These crossed and conflicting duties 
demonstrate why Congress should not entrust the responsibility to 
protect public rights to a judicial entity that owes a duty only to its 
private clients and the court. 
IV. THE FISC SHOULD INTERPRET THE AMICUS DUTY BROADLY TO 
AVOID DECLARING IT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
To read the amicus duty so broadly as to allow the amicus to 
support intelligence collection would be to “impl[y] that the 
legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it 
employed.”290  Congress’s specific intent and choice of words is quite 
clear.  During consideration of the FREEDOM Act, congressional 
debate focused squarely on whether Congress should act to introduce 
different and more adversarial arguments to the FISC to counter the 
government’s arguments.291  A broad reading of the statute arguably 
                                            
Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(Posner, C.J., in chambers). 
 287. See, e.g., Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 380–81 (1955) (appointing an 
amicus to represent a criminal defendant when his appointed attorney could not 
present oral argument). 
 288. Yahoo! Inc.’s Unclassified Motion for a Status Conference at 3, In re 
Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the FISA, No. 105(B)(g) 07-01 (FISA Ct. Feb. 
5, 2016).  Mr. Zwillinger was also the first of the amicus pool appointed to appear 
under 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i), and he argued the case decided by the FISC-R in April 
2014.  In re Certified Question of Law, No. FISCR 16-01, slip op. at 1 (FISA Ct. Rev. 
Apr. 14, 2016) (per curiam). 
 289. 161 CONG. REC. S3396 (2015) (daily ed. June 1, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Blumenthal). 
 290. EIG, supra note 25, at 13 (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 
(1883)). 
 291. See supra text accompanying notes 94–116. 
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ignores Congress’s intent to create a new entity, with mandatory 
duties, that must present arguments when the judge decides novel 
and significant legal interpretations.292  It would also assume that 
Congress’s choice to add language did not have a purpose or change 
the statute’s meaning.293  Nevertheless, such a questionable reading is 
required to avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional. 
For example, if the words “support individual privacy and civil 
liberties” do not prevent an amicus from supporting intelligence 
collection or pro-surveillance legal arguments, then the phrase is 
essentially “inoperative . . . superfluous, void[,] or insignificant.”294  
The phrase would serve no purpose because if the words were not 
there, the amicus would be permitted to advance the exact same 
arguments that it could advance with the words in the statute. 
In fact, the FISC has already weighed the competing interests 
between statutory interpretation and its exercise of inherent 
functions when interpreting another provision of the amicus section 
of the statute.295  The court held that “[a]lthough the statutory 
framework is somewhat tangled,” the court will interpret the statute 
“in a manner that gives meaning to all of its provisions, or it can 
ignore those principles and conclude that Congress passed an 
irrational statute with multiple superfluous parts.”296  The court also 
demonstrated an exercise of its inherent authority to control the 
amicus process by declining to hear from an amicus even though the 
matter presented a “novel or significant” interpretation of the law.297 
                                            
 292. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (stating that courts interpreting 
statutory language should consider the context of when the legislature passed the law). 
 293. See, e.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 318 (2009) (citing legislative 
history to discredit a bright-line reading of a statutory amendment when that reading 
rendered the change superfluous and created conflicts with other rules). 
 294. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101. 
 295. The FISC was interpreting the meaning of the statute’s requirement to 
appoint an amicus when “appropriate” to assist with a “novel or significant 
interpretation of the law.”  In re Applications of the FBI for Orders Requiring the 
Prod. of Tangible Things, Nos. BR 15-77, BR 15-78, slip op. at 5–6 (FISA Ct. June 17, 
2015).  The court concluded that although a novel or significant issue was presented, 
the appropriate outcome was sufficiently clear, and the amicus would not “materially 
assist the court in making [the] decision.”  Id. at 6.  Thus, an amicus’s appointment 
was “not appropriate.”  Id. 
 296. Id. at 6 (emphasis added); see also In re Certified Question of Law, No. FISCR 
16-01, slip. op. at 16 (FISA Ct. Rev. Apr. 14, 2016) (per curiam) (“[W]e are to avoid 
interpreting one statutory provision in a manner that would render another 
provision superfluous.”). 
 297. In re Applications of the FBI, Nos. BR 15-77, BR 15-78, slip op. at 5–6. 
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But in the end, this broad, even superfluous reading, while 
questionable, is at least facially defensible and should be employed as 
a last resort to avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional.  This 
Comment takes this position for purely pragmatic reasons because 
the priorities of national security, judicial and DOJ efficiency, and 
privacy would not be served by any litigation over the constitutionality 
of this subsection.  It is far easier for the FISC judge simply to accept 
any arguments from the amicus that the judge deems helpful, 
whether they be pro-privacy or pro-surveillance.  Likely, the DOJ 
lawyers will not be objecting or appealing if a FISA amicus offers a 
pro-surveillance argument.  Moreover, any group that filed with the 
FISC, or any district court, to object to an amicus violating its 
statutory duty would probably lack standing.298  But the analysis is 
important because Congress chose specific words, for specific 
reasons, with specific intent, and the effects of those words infringe 
on judicial power.  If the priorities listed above were not at stake, this 
author would argue that the FISC should declare the statute 
unconstitutional the first time that a FISA amicus proffered a pro-
surveillance argument.  But the FISC can more easily justify a broad 
interpretation under the canon of constitutional avoidance and 
simply allow any potentially helpful amicus arguments under a broad 
interpretation of the duty.299  Each amicus should know that they are 
free to provide the court with their honest, unvarnished, and 
uninfluenced views of the Constitution and the law. 
CONCLUSION 
While courts should give meaning to every word of a statute, it is 
more important for a court to retain its inherent powers and discharge 
its constitutional duty to decide and interpret the law, administer 
justice, and effectually determine a case’s outcome.300  When Congress 
reformed the FISA statute and the FISC’s procedures, it purposefully 
meant to increase the diversity of the legal arguments before the 
court.301  Previously, the FISC had approved the vast majority of 
                                            
 298. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting that only the government 
and telecommunications companies have so far established standing in FISA 
intelligence collection matters). 
 299. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (invoking the principle that 
courts should use the statutory interpretation that avoids a constitutional 
determination when considering two possible interpretations). 
 300. See supra Section II.A. 
 301. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. S3431 (daily ed. June 2, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Blumenthal). 
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government surveillance applications and, even though companies 
were empowered to oppose compulsion orders, such opposition was 
either rare or is still classified.302  When Congress required the FISC to 
hear arguments from an amicus to help it determine novel or 
significant legal issues, it reached the limit of its enumerated powers to 
authorize court procedures and substantive law.  To preserve the 
judicial power, Congress must cede control of the process where 
judicial interpretation begins so the court can retain full authority over 
the consideration of legal arguments.303 
Further, preventing the court from hearing a potentially helpful 
legal argument would be at odds with the entire purpose of the 
amicus provision—to provide more diverse legal arguments to the 
court.  This priority is especially apparent when analyzing the 
members of the amicus pool.  Some individuals are well-known 
privacy advocates, while others have previously worked for the DOJ.304  
If two of these experts have divergent legal arguments, then imposing 
on both a converging, partisan guiding principle would be illogical 
and would deprive the court of informed and diverse legal 
arguments.  Even if the government is already promoting one pro-
surveillance argument, the court may be requesting the amici pool to 
provide different or distinguishing legal arguments—be they pro-
surveillance, pro-privacy, or something in between.  The 
government’s lawyers owe a duty to their clients, the NSA and the 
FBI.  The amicus pool owes a duty only to themselves and to the 
court, and thus all of the amici should be fully free to provide the 
court with legal arguments anywhere on the spectrum of pertinent 
legal issues for each respective appearance. 
The statute should be interpreted, as the FISC rightfully has 
interpreted it so far, to allow the appearance of an amicus when it 
“would materially assist the court in making [a] decision,”305 and the 
FISC should at that point take complete control of the amicus 
process.  To interpret the statute any other way, even if such 
interpretation would be the only way to give every word meaning, 
would result in an improper congressional encroachment on the 
inherent judicial power. 
                                            
 302. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
 303. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (holding it is the 
duty of the court to effectively “say what the law is”). 
 304. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text. 
 305. In re Applications of the FBI for Orders Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things, Nos. BR 15-77, BR 15-78, slip op. at 6 (FISA Ct. June 17, 2015). 
